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Proposals for Limiting Foreign Investment
Risk Under the Exon-Florio Amendment
by
CECELIA M. WALDECK*
In the 1988 Presidential campaign Michael Dukakis warned the
American public that the level of foreign investment and ownership
in the United States had become a "threat" to the economic and mil-
itary security of the nation.' Since then, because of continued foreign
acquisitions of domestic businesses and real estate, including Colum-
bia Pictures and Rockefeller Center, the debate over direct foreign
investment has intensified. 2
One product of this debate is the Exon-Florio Amendment
("Amendment"), which was adopted on August 23, 1988, as section
5021 of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act. 3 This amendment to the De-
fense Production Act 4 regulates foreign acquisitions that impact U.S.
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1976, University of Cincinnati; M.B.A. 1979, San
Francisco State University.
1. At a rally in Hartford, Connecticut, Michael Dukakis declared that the U.S. should
start "selling more American goods and services and buying back our own bonds and land and
factories from the Japanese and the Europeans and the Saudis." Rosenthal, Dukakis Says
Standard of Living Is Deteriorating, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1988, at D30, col. 2.
Annual increases in new foreign direct investment are reflected in the following Commerce
Department figures on new foreign investments in the U.S. each year: 1980-$9.0; 1981-$14.8;
1982-$9.7; 1983-$8.7; 1984-$15.0; 1985-$15.2; 1986-$25.1; 1987-$30.6--1988-$40.4; 1989-
$46.7 (figures rounded to nearest billion dollars). BuREAu oF EcoNolmc Axrysis, U.S. DEP'T
op CommEcE, SURvEY or CupanqT Bus~mmss Table 9 (Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.:
Position and Balance of Payment Flows) (Aug. 1990). The total direct foreign investment position
during these same years was: 1980-$83.0; 1981-$108.7; 1982-$124.7; 1983-$137.0; 1984-
$164.6; 1985-$184.6; 1986-$220.4; 1987-$271.8; 1988-$328.9; 1989-$400.8 (figures rounded
to nearest billion dollars) Id.
2. See generally Schwartz, Japan Goes Hollywood, NEwswEEx, Oct. 9, 1989, at 62-67.
3. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1425
(1988).
4. Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798 (1988). The Defense
Production Act, and consequently, the Exon-Florio Amendment, expired in October 1990. Since
then, bills authorizing the extension of the Act through September 30, 1991, have been passed
in both the House and Senate. 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1507, at 380 (Mar.
14, 1991). Because the provisions of the two bills differ, the bills will be submitted to a joint
House and Senate Conference Committee. Id. The House bill, H.R. 991, exempts the Exon-
Florio Amendment from any future termination, a provision opposed by the Bush Administration.
Id. The Senate bill has no similar provision. Id. Both bills would permit the Exon-Florio
Amendment to apply retroactively to October 20, 1990, the Act's original expiration date. 56
Banking Rep. (BNA) 530 (Mar. 18, 1991). Despite the expiration of the Defense Production Act,
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national security. Under the Exon-Florio Amendment, the President
may take the following actions:
suspend or prohibit any acquisition, merger, or takeover, of a person
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States proposed or
pending on or after August 23, 1988 by or with foreign persons so
that such control will not threaten to impair the national secu-
rity .... The President may direct the Attorney General to seek ap-
propriate relief, including divestment relief, in the district courts of
the United States in order to implement and enforce this section.'
The President must announce the decision to take these actions,
however, within fifteen days after the completion of an executive in-
vestigation of the foreign acquisition. 6 Paragraph (a) of the Exon-Flo-
rio Amendment, authorizing this investigation, provides:
The President or the President's designee may make an investigation
to determine the effects on national security of mergers, acquisi-
tions, and takeovers proposed or pending on or after August 23,
1988 by or with foreign persons which could result in foreign control
of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States. If
it is determined that an investigation should be undertaken, it shall
commence no later than 30 days after receipt by the President or
the President's designee of written notification of the proposed or
pending merger, acquisition, or takeover as prescribed by regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to this section. Such investigation shall
be completed no later than 45 days after such determination.7
Pursuant to an investigation under paragraph (a), the President
may take actions to block a foreign acquisition upon a finding that:
(1) there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe that
the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threat-
ens to impair the national security, and .... (2) provisions of law,
other than this section and the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act do not in the President's judgment provide adequate and
appropriate authority for the President to protect the national se-
curity in the matter before the President.8
The legislative history of the Exon-Florio Amendment indicates
that Congress intentionally left the meaning of "national security"
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has continued to conduct
in-depth investigations of acquisition and merger transactions involving foreign parties under the
authority conferred by Executive Order 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971-1975), and in accordance
with the proposed regulations. Id.; see also infra note 17 (describing CFIUS). CFIUS, however,
does not plan to submit any of its recommendations to the President until after the Defense
Production Act is reauthorized by Congress. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1739 (Nov. 14, 1990).
Joseph Dennin, an attorney currently representing parties in Exon-Florio reviews, notes that the
added uncertainty created by the non-binding effect of CFIUS recommendations during this
interim period adversely may effect a target company's stock price. Id.
5. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (1988).
6. Id.
7. Id. § 2170(a).
8. Id. § 2170(d) (citation omitted).
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undefined in order to delegate broad discretion to the President. 9
Congress did "suggest," 10 however, that the President or the Pres-
ident's designee take into account the following factors when con-
sidering national security:
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense re-
quirements, (2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries
to meet national defense requirements, including the availability of
human resources, products, technology, materials, and other sup-
plies and services, and (3) the control of domestic industries and
commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability and
capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of national
security."
This Note argues that decisions based on the national security
standard established by the Exon-Florio Amendment and its related
regulations are essentially political. Judicial review of these decisions
is likely to be limited to_ procedural matters only; 12 thus, the wary
foreign investor must read the political winds when a new Admin-
istration takes office. This added risk for the foreign investor is likely
to have repercussions on U.S. foreign relations, especially with those
nations with which the U.S. has Friendship, Commerce, and Navi-
gation Treaties (FCN), 13 bilateral investment treaties (BIT),' 4 and mul-
tinational agreements.' 5 Currently, with the government's growing
dependence on foreign capital to finance the deficit, government of-
ficials wish to avoid alienating foreign investors. 16
9. See H.R. Coin'. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 514, 926, reprinted in 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws 1547. The Conference Report states that the standard of review
under the Amendment is "national security." Id. Although the Conferees did not intend to
authorize investigations of foreign acquisitions that are "outside the realm of national security,"
they stated that the national security standard should "be interpreted broadly without limitation
to particular industries." Id. Moreover, the Conference Report states that "[t]he Conferees
recognize that the term 'national security' is not a defined term in the Defense Production Act
... [and they do not mean] to imply any limitation on the term 'national defense' as used
elsewhere in the ... Act." Id.
10. The factors enacted as paragraph (e) of the Amendment are described as "guidance...
which may be considered in conducting an investigation." Id. The Conference Report states that
"[niothing in this [Amendment] is meant to imply that past interpretations of the extraordinary
breadth of the Defense Production Act or its grant of authority to the President is incorrect."
Id. The Report further states that past interpretations of the Act that defined "national defense"
as including "the provision of a broad range of goods and services, as well as technological
innovations and economic stabilization efforts," were correct. Id. at 926-27.
11. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (1988).
12. Paragraph (d) of the Amendment provides that the findings supporting the President's
decision to block a foreign acquisition "shall not to be subject to judicial review." Id. § 2170(d).
13. These are bilateral commercial treaties that establish a legal framework for both trade
and business transactions between the nationals of the signatory nations. See Scaccia, Title VII
and Treaty Rights Battles: The Verdict Is Still Out, 10 ASILS IiN'L L.J. 77, 77 (1986).
14. Alvarez, The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 31-46 (1989).
15. Id. at 46-50.
16. One Treasury Department official reportedly commented that a voluntary notification
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For both legal and policy reasons, this Note proposes that the
vague national security standard contained in the Exon-Florio
Amendment be defined by specification of (1) exempt industries, (2)
protected technologies, (3) exempt ownership arrangements (i.e., ir-
revocable trusts), and (4) a definition of foreign control that exempts
de minimus foreign equity interests. These types of exemptions and
guidelines can be established best by the Committee on Foreign In-
vestment in the United States (CFIUS),' 7 the regulatory group au-
thorized by the President to undertake investigations of foreign
acquisitions under the Exon-Florio Amendment.
This Note further proposes that the CFIUS be re-established un-
der a congressional statute as a more formal and independent reg-
ulatory body, responsible for both reviewing acquisitions and
developing policies that define those industries or enterprises that are
not critical to the national security. Such an independent regulatory
body, as opposed to the current committee of government department
representatives, would be more likely to adopt and follow specific
guidelines in reviewing acquisitions and would minimize the current
dominance of the Treasury Department in the decisionmaking proc-
ess. Currently, the Treasury Department can exert more influence on
CFIUS decisions than other agency members in the CFIUS as a result
of its position as chair of the CFIUS and its substantial role in the
routine review functions. The conservative posture taken by the CFIUS
in maintaining an open door policy toward foreign investment reflects
the Treasury Department's influence. 8
requirement was part of an effort by the Department to weaken the effect of the Amendment
on foreign investments. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1630 (Dec. 14, 1988). This position
by the Treasury Department reflects its institutional interest in maintaining a free flow of
investment capital into the U.S. Dennin, Getting a Transaction Past CEJUS: A Businessman's
Guide to Exon-Florio, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 375 (Mar. 22, 1989). Other agency
members of the CFIUS are divided on whether more barriers to foreign investment are needed.
Id. at 375-76. For example, some Commerce Department officials are committed to protecting
U.S. businesses from foreign acquisition, while others are fearful of retaliatory actions by other
nations that could limit the inflow of much needed foreign capital. Id.; see 7 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 13, at 444 (Mar. 28, 1990).
17. This is an interagency group composed of representatives from the Departments of
Treasury, State, Defense, and Commerce, the Council of Economic Advisors, and the U.S.
Trade Representative that was established on May 7, 1975 by President Ford. Exec. Order No.
11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975); see 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1630 (Dec. 14,
1988). Until the passage of the Exon-Florio Amendment, the group's responsibilities were limited
to collecting and analyzing data on foreign investment in the U.S., reviewing foreign investments
that would impact U.S. national interests, and developing legislative and regulatory proposals
relating to foreign investments.
18. From the passage of the Amendment until February 1990, the CFIUS made only six
full-scale investigations of foreign acquisitions. In three of the six acquisitions, President Bush
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The suggestions outlined in this Note for limiting the discretion
enjoyed by the executive branch under the current version of the Exon-
Florio Amendment and its proposed regulations are based on a review
of past and current laws restricting inward foreign investments' 9 and
an analysis of the legal issues raised by the Amendment. Part I of
this Note begins with an overview of the policy debate on the value
of inward-foreign investments in the United States. Part II then re-
views past and current legal restrictions on foreign investments. Part
III outlines the Exon-Florio Amendment along with its proposed re-
gulations, raising possible constitutional and international law chal-
lenges. Finally, the Note concludes with an argument for limiting the
scope of the Exon-Florio Amendment by the adoption of industry
exemptions and guidelines that protect actual military interests rather
than broader economic interests.
I. The Debate Over Foreign Investment
Prior to the 1970s there was not much public debate over the
merits of foreign investment in the U.S.2o In recent years, however,
foreign investments in the U.S. have been heatedly debated. 2' This
debate has led to new legislative initiatives such as the Exon-Florio
Amendment. 2This Part will review the arguments of this debate23
decided to take no action. These investigations involved the acquisition of Monsanto Electronic
Materials Co. by Huels A.G. (a German firm), an electrical joint venture between Westinghouse
Electric Corp. and ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. (a Swedish-Swiss firm), and the acquisition by
Matra S.A. (a French firm) of three Fairchild Industries divisions that engage in space and
defense electronics technology. In two of the six cases, the parties withdrew from the transaction
during the CFIUS 45-day investigation period. These involved the acquisition of Tachonics Corp.
by Lalbhai Group (an Indian firm) and the acquisition of General Ceramics, Inc. by Tokuyama
Soda Co. (a Japanese f'm). Finally, on February 1, 1990, pursuant to the sixth fully investigated
acquisition, President Bush ordered a divestiture of MAMCO, Inc., a Seattle manufacturer of
metal components used in aircraft. The new owner of MAMCO, China National Aero-Technology
Import and Export Corp., was connected closely to the government of China. President Invokes
Exon-Florio, Blocks Acquisition of Aircraft Components Maker, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
0BNA) No. 1452, at 225-26 (Feb. 8, 1990).
19. "Inward foreign investments" refers to investments in U.S. companies, securities, real
estate, etc., made by foreign nationals.
20. Arpan, Flowers & Ricks, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: The State of
Knowledge in Research, in INTEoNATioNAL Busi;Ess KNowLEDGE 169 (W. Dymsza & R. Vambery
ed. 1987).
21. Id...
22. For a listing of legislative initiatives during the 1970s, see the appendix in Shecter,
FIRA: Experiences of a U.S. Lawyer, in CuRaRNT LEGAL AsPECTS oF DoiG BusINESS i CANADA
38, 45-51 (ABA ed. 1976). Other legislative initiatives in the 1980s included two bills sponsored
by Rep. John Bryant of Texas and Sen. Tom Harkin of Iowa to address a perceived "data gap"
in the collection and compilation of foreign investment data. Closing the 'Ignorance Gap,' 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 955 (Jul. 19, 1989).
23. For a concise listing of some of the arguments against foreign investments in the U.S.,
see M. ToLcuIN & S. TorcmNr, BuYa iNTo AMRICA 24-25 (Berkley paperback ed. 1988).
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to provide the reader with an understanding of the political forces
existing at the time the Amendment was enacted and, more broadly,
of the problems that foreign investment regulations attempt to solve.
A. The Nature of Foreign Investment
Foreign investment is defined as the international movement of
direct investment capital and portfolio-related capital (purchases of
foreign bonds and stock) across national borders. 24 Typically, direct
investment capital moves across national borders into a particular
recipient or host nation in response to opportunities for higher prof-
its, more favorable tax and legal environments, and other factors that
mitigate investment risk. 2 In the past, economists have found a pos-
itive correlation between a prosperous national economy and the level
of inward direct foreign investment capital. 26
Portfolio-related capital generally moves across national borders
in response to short-term differentials in the interest rates between
countries. 27 Nations can solve temporary balance of payments deficits
24. See M. KREInN, INTERNATIONAL EcONOMcs: A POLICY APPROACH 83 (2d ed. 1975). See
generally C. VALENTINE, Tr ARTHuR YouNG INTERNATIONAL BusINEss GUImE (1988) (providing
a general discussion on evaluating the national climate for foreign investment).
Foreign direct investment is defined by the Commerce Department as "ownership or control
of 10% or more of an enterprise's voting securities." Quijana, A Guide to BEA Statistics on
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, Sutrv. CuRENr Bus., Feb. 1990, at 29. The
Bureau of Economic Analysis uses this definition when it collects data on direct foreign investment.
Id.
25. The authors of The New Competitors characterize the favorable investment climate of
the U.S. as resulting from long-term factors that include a large consumer market, a regulatory
environment that permits foreign investments, limited labor relations regulation as compared to
other nations, and the presence of high technology. N. GucKMANu & D. WOODWARD, THE NEW
CoMPETITORs 35, 96-97 (1989). In addition, they theorize that short-term factors such as the
federal budget deficit and related trade deficits have attracted a large portion of new foreign
investment to the U.S. during the 1980s. Id. at 111-12.
As the federal budget deficit grew during the 1980s, the domestic demand for capital increased.
Id. at 111. Because this increase in demand was not offset by an increase in the domestic savings
rate, the Federal Reserve Board adopted a policy of maintaining high interest rates in order to
attract foreign capital to fund the U.S. government debt. Id. By the mid-1980s the U.S. trade
deficit, which resulted largely from the failure of U.S. exports to balance the growing levels of
U.S. imports, was reaching a crisis level. Id. at 113-14. In response to this crisis, the U.S.
obtained the support of foreign central banks in Japan, West Germany, Great Britain, Canada,
and Italy to "manage" a decline in the value of the dollar. Id. at 114. This decline, which is
essentially a protectionist policy equivalent to a tariff, permitted foreigners to buy cheaper U.S.
goods, businesses, and real estate. Id. at 115. For a contrary view on the effects of the federal
budget and trade deficits on foreign investments in the U.S., see E. GA.HAMu & P. KRUGMAN,
INsTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMics, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
34-37 (1989).
26. See M. KInqiN, supra note 24, at 83.
27. Id. at 83-84.
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by raising their interest rates, thereby attracting short-term capital
from foreign investors. 28 The U.S. government finances its deficit by
adopting monetary policies that attract foreign capital.29
Historically, the U.S. has advocated an open door policy toward
foreign investment,30 and today this policy continues under the Bush
Administration. 3' Advocates of an open door policy argue that in-
flows of foreign capital benefit host nations not only by attracting
plant and equipment expansion, but also by providing new jobs, tech-
nologies, and opportunities to develop managerial skills.3 2 An ex-
ample of these benefits is found in the acquisition by a Japanese
company of the Firestone tire plant in La Vergne, Tennessee, in 1980.33
The plant was being closed because of financial difficulties resulting
from plant labor problems and a major recall of defective tires.
Bridgestone, the Japanese company, was the only bidder for the plant.
Following its purchase of the plant, previously laid-off workers were
rehired. The new Japanese owners adopted management policies that
alleviated many of the plant's labor difficulties and re-established it
as a profitable enterprise.
Such benefits from foreign investments have encouraged many
governors, mayors, and other political leaders to compete for foreign
28. Id.
29. In May 1987 foreign investors did not bid on $29 billion of T-bills auctioned by the
Treasury. M. ToLcmN & S. ToLcOHI, supra note 23, at 8. Because the sale was needed to finance
the deficit, the Treasury Department reduced the price of the T-bills two days later. Id. This
encouraged their sale to foreign investors. Id. at 8-9.
30. See id. at 265-66.
31. This is illustrated by the restraint of the CFIUS in disapproving investigated acquisitions.
See infra note 289 and accompanying text; supra note 18. On the campaign trail in 1988,
President Bush criticized the Democratic Party's policy on inward foreign investment by comparing
it to the "Know-Nothing" movement, a small political party organized in the 1850s to resist
foreign influence. Burgess, Dukakis Keys in on Foreign Investment, Wash. Post, Oct. 13, 1988,
at 1, col. 1; see also House Subcommittee Debates Virtues of Exon-Fiorio Provision, 59 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1477, at 186 (Aug. 2, 1990) (detailing the Bush Administration's
objections to broadening the scope of the Exon-Florio provision).
32. See M. KRmINI, supra note 24, at 242. Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary of Commerce
during the Reagan Administration, advocated the open door policy because "investment in the
U.S. does provide jobs, financing, and helps keep interest rates down .... [S]ocially as well as
financially there's much more gain to having an open investment policy throughout the world
than the converse, which are barriers that impede capital flows." M. ToLcmIN & S. ToLcmN,
supra note 23, at 25.
33. See M. ToLcmN & S. ToacamN, supra note 23, at 76-78. Comments made by plant
employees on the Japanese management included: "The Japanese are also big on training ....
[Training] is extended to top management, and they ain't got no choice." Id. at 78. "Bridgestone
seems to listen.... With Firestone you were just a machine that worked eight hours." Id. at
77. "The Americans want to get something done today.... They don't want to think about it.
With the Japanese, it takes them a month; they want to make sure it's the right decision. I've
learned from them." Id. at 78.
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investment capital.14 For example, in 1985, the Governor of Tennessee
aggressively sought to locate the U.S. plant of Komatsu, the second
largest manufacturer of construction equipment in the world, in Chat-
tanooga, Tennessee. 5 As part of the deal, Hamilton County loaned
Komatsu twenty million dollars raised through industrial development
bonds. The loan was used to purchase and modernize an abandoned
plant and to purchase plant equipment. In addition, the county gave
Komatsu property tax deferrals.16
In spite of these benefits, significantly increased levels of inward
foreign investment have sparked a growing debate in the U.S. over
the merits of foreign capital.3 7 Proponents of continuing the U.S.
open door policy toward foreign investment charge that protectionist
sentiment lies at the heart of this debate, rather than concern for any
serious economic or political threat to national security.3 8 The debate
itself involves a variety of issues ranging from questions of general
reciprocity between nations to the effects of tax policies that favor
foreign investors over domestic businesses. 9
B. The Economic Impact of Foreign Investment
An underlying issue in the debate is whether the current types
of foreign direct investment will benefit the U.S. economy over the
34. States and local municipalities have used a variety of strategies to attract foreign
investments. These include economic incentives, establishment of overseas offices that represent
the state to foreign investors, and public policies that result in a favorable business environment.
Id. at 45.
35. Id. at 67-73.
36. Id.
37. In 1985, the U.S. became a debtor nation for the first time since World War I. Id. at
8. The following figures from the Commerce Department reflect the increase in foreign investments
in the U.S.: 1914-$7.2; 1935-$6.3; 1950-$17.6; 1970-$107; 1979-$407; 1983-$781.5; 1987
- $1,500 (dollars in billions). N. GuccmA_ & D. WooDw An, supra note 25, at 28.
38. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 14, at 104-05; Krugman, On the International Capital
Ownership Pattern at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, 33 Eui. EcoN. REv. 1083, 1084
(1989); Schaefer & Strongen, Why All the Fuss About Foreign Investment?, 32 CHALLENGE 31
(1989).
39. Some of the issues debated include the following: (1) whether nations exporting capital
to the U.S. should be required to execute reciprocity agreements with the U.S. to ensure equal
treatment of U.S. nationals investing capital in those nations; (2) whether the effect, beneficial
or not, of direct foreign investment on the U.S. trade balance should be a factor in authorizing
such investments; (3) whether the repatriation of profits from U.S. subsidiaries to foreign parent
corporations should be restricted; (4) whether U.S. tax policies give foreign owned businesses a
competitive edge over U.S.-owned domestic businesses; and (5) whether acquisitions of new
technologies by foreign investors operating in a less restrictive business environment should be
permitted. For example, a Japanese firm may have an unfair advantage over a similarly situated
U.S. firm because the Japanese firm can participate in certain anti-competitive practices that are
outlawed in the U.S. See M. ToLcHmN & S. ToLcIIE, supra note 23, at 25.
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long run. In the past, the development of the U.S. economy was largely
the result of foreign capital.4° The French and British were major
investors in U.S. railroads, canals, copper mines, and cotton plan-
tations .41
As the U.S. economy matured, the nature of foreign investment
changed. Today, the U.S. maintains a sophisticated economy with a
large service-oriented sector as well as high-tech businesses that main-
tain their profitability by developing new technologies at a rapid pace. 42
Current foreign investments are concentrated in government debt in-
struments, banking assets, and real estate. 43 The main benefits to the
U.S. of such investments are the financing of government deficits and
consumer spending." Some fear that in the long run this type of for-
eign investment will weaken the U.S. economy and increase U.S. de-
pendence on substantial amounts of foreign portfolio investment. 45
Whether this current form of foreign investment characterizes a ma-
ture economy or largely results from past U.S. economic and business
policies is debatable."
40. Id. at 265-68. Early dependence on foreign investment included the foreign financing of
U.S. federal and state government debt. In 1807, European investors held one-half of all U.S.
federal and state debts and securities along with one-fourth of all municipal debts and securities.
Id. at 266. By the 1840s, concern over these sizable foreign investments led many states to place
restrictions on government borrowings. Nine states along with the Bank of the United States
actually defaulted on their loan payments. As a result, the credit rating of the U.S. among
foreign investors suffered. Id. Gold was discovered in California in 1849, however, and foreign
investments were maintained. Id. at 267.
41. Id. at 266. Foreign investors owned one-third of all U.S. railroad securities by 1853. Id.
The construction of the Erie Canal largely was financed by foreign investors. Id. at 265. The
majority of the nation's cotton plantations were mortgaged to London investors. Id.
42. See T. STAmaACK, P. BE~kw, T. NoYana & R. KAVAsEx, SEnvicas: Tam NEw ECoNoMY
6-17 (1981).
43. In 1986, foreign investors held U.S. government debt instruments valued at $300-400
billion (15-20% of total issues), U.S. bank assets valued at $445 billion, diversified stocks and
bonds valued at $300 billion, real estate valued at more than $100 billion, and investments in
factories, warehouses, and assembly plants valued at $200-300 billion. Id. at 4.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2-3. Between 1973 and 1986, foreign investment in U.S. bank assets increased
from $32 billion to $445 billion (this was about 16% of total U.S. bank assets). Concentrations
of this investment are localized in states such as California and New York. See M. ToLcIN &
S. Tocm, supra note 23, at 121-22. In addition, foreign investors have owned substantial
interests in such Wall Street investment banking firms as Goldman Sachs, Wertheim Schroder &
Co., and Drexel Burnham Lambert. Id. at 5-6; see also N. GucKMAN & D. WOODWARD, supra
note 25, at 111-16 (discussing the influx of foreign investment in the United States during the
1980s and the resulting problem of the growing trade deficit).
At the end of 1986, the U.S. held a net external debt of $264 billion (6.3% of nominal GNP),
reflecting a shift from its past status as a capital exporter to a capital importer. Hamada &
Iwata, On the International Capital Ownership Pattern at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century,
33 EtR. EcoN. R-v. 1055, 1055 (1989); see also supra note 25.
46. See, e:g., N. GucmAN & D. WOODWARD, supra note 25, at 13-18.
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Critics even have questioned whether foreign investments in the
U.S. industrial sector, which traditionally have been considered ben-
eficial, are economically valuable.47 For example, foreigners invested
in U.S. television and automobile manufacturing companies to evade
potential U.S. trade barriers erected to protect domestic enterprises
from foreign competitors. 48 Although these types of investments result
in more domestic jobs, they circumvent established trade policies. 49
Critics contend that these investments should be viewed as part of the
trade policy of the investor's government, 0 thus underscoring the need
for integration of trade and foreign investment policies.5
Foreign investments in domestic high-technology businesses also
have been cited by some as a maneuver around statutes protecting
the export of technologies out of the U.S.12 In 1986 there was much
business and political concern over the proposed acquisition of Fair-
child Semiconductors, a pioneer in the manufacture of semiconduc-
tors for the electronics industry, by Fujitsu Ltd., a large Japanese
computer manufacturer. 3 Although it was a U.S. corporation, Fair-
child Semiconductors was wholly-owned by a French multinational
at the time of the offer. Concern over the proposed acquisition fo-
cused on both the classified U.S. defense contracts held by Fairchild 4
and, more importantly, the potential loss of a key technology, namely
the development of large integrated circuits." In the press, the pro-
posed acquisition was portrayed as illustrative of the loss of the Amer-
ican competitive edge in microprocessor development to the Japanese.
As a result of pressure from Washington, Fujitsu ultimately aban-
doned the transaction.16
47. M. ToLcBIN & S. ToLcmN, supra note 23, at 7, 13.
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id. at 13.
50. Id.
51. During the Uruguay Round, the members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade recently examined the effects of national investment policies on international trade. Alvarez,
supra note 14, at 53 (citing 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 46, 48 (Nov. 1986)).
52. See M. ToLcaN & S. ToINcmN, supra note 23, at 9-10.
53. Sanger, Japanese Purchase of Chipmaker Cancelled After Objections in U.S., N.Y.
Times, Mar. 17, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
54. Military products produced by Fairchild included "emitter coupled logic chips" used in
advanced computer systems. Id. at Dll, col. 1. The Pentagon could have terminated these
contracts, however, had the acquisition been consummated. Id. at Al, col. 1.
55. Defense Department and CIA officials claimed they wanted to prevent the American
computer industry from becoming dependent on Japanese-owned manufacturers. Id. at D 11, col.
1.
56. Id. U.S. Senators, including Senator Exon of New Jersey and Senator Metzenbaum of
Ohio, lobbied the Reagan Administration to block the acquisition. Exon, Metzenbaum Attack
Fairchild-Fujitsu Deal, Defense and Antitrust Concerns Raised, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
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Critics also claim that foreign investment may threaten U.S. con-
trol over its own national economy because of the substantial foreign
investments in financial institutions and debt instrumentsYs7 National
economic independence has eroded in debtor nations such as Brazil,
where creditors-foreign governments as well as private foreign
banks-substantially influence domestic economic decisions.5 8 In the
U.S. substantial foreign investments in financial institutions have raised
fears that there may be too much foreign influence over the internal
business policies of highly leveraged companies and institutional
investors .59
Certain internal business decisions that impact the financial po-
sition of a highly leveraged company, such as plans for plant ex-
pansion or major new research programs, may be influenced by foreign
bankers and other investors who hold a substantial amount of the
enterprise's debt.60 Moreover, if the company defaults, these bankers
and investors may acquire ownership interests in the enterprise.61 Thus,
when foreign investors finance a highly leveraged company, there is
opportunity for foreign influence and control.
Concern over the potential for foreign control of the decisions
made by financial institutions managing large portfolio investments
3, at 71 (Jan. 21, 1987). After a four-month investigation, the Reagan Administration, under
the auspices of the CFIUS, concluded that the acquisition did not threaten national security.
Rempel & Walters, The Fairchild Deal, L.A. Times, Nov. 30, 1987, pt. 1, at 1, col. 1.
On the other side, charges were made that the Justice Department's antitrust investigation of
the proposed acquisition went beyond a routine level of review as a result of political pressure
from opponents of the transaction. See Guterl, Bitter Lessons for Fairchild's Donald Brooks,
Bus. Morr=, Nov. 1987, at 33.
57. Representative Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), a member of the House Banking Committee,
stated that the increase in foreign investments in banking gives "non-Americans the decision on
where to put the money." M. TorcmN & S. TocmN, supra note 23, at 129. Rusty Oswald,
chief economist for the AFL-CIO, fears that "[i]f you lose [ownership] control of banks, you
lose control of monetary policy." Id.
58. See generally A. MAcEwA, DEBT & DisoRaER: INTERNATiONAL EcoNowrc I JsTARI
AN U.S. hI'mumI DEcamn (1990).
59. Institutional investors include insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, banks,
and trusts that own securities issued by U.S. corporations. Business Week estimated that in 1988
institutional investors on the average owned 50% of the outstanding securities of 900 surveyed
corporations. Business Week Investment Outlook Scoreboard, BusniEss WEEK, Dec. 25, 1989, at
155. Collectively, these investors are a major force in the financial markets. See generally R.
BARBER, THE AmAmucAN CoRPoRAToN 57-58 (1970).
60. As a condition for obtaining a large loan or floating a new bond issue, a corporation
frequently must agree to restrictions on financial policy, mergers and acquisitions, and profit
distribution. D. Korz, BA.iK CoNTRoL oF LARGE CoRPoRA oNs iN THE UNrrD STATES 20
(paperback ed. 1980). In addition to these direct restrictions, lenders may indirectly exert even
more formidable control over a corporation's business policy by denying further financing,
obtaining the right to appoint corporate officers and directors, or otherwise influencing corporate
policy decisions. Id. at 21.
61. Id. at 20-21.
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is equally great. With the rising popularity of investment funds and
other institutionally managed savings plans, financial institutions ex-
ert substantial influence on the stock and bond markets.62 The in-
creased size of institutional funds coupled with a high degree of
concentration among bank trust departments, investment firms, and
life insurance companies have resulted in a greater concentration of
financial power. 63 Thus, the investment decisions of these entities sig-
nificantly affect stock valuesA4
C. The Political Impact of Foreign Investments
In addition to the debate over the economic value of foreign in-
vestment, criticism has focused on the increasing influence of foreign
investors in American politics. 65 The Senate debates over the proposed
1984 Clean Water Act exemplify this influence. Sitka Mill, a Japa-
nese-owned lumber mill located in Alaska, effectively lobbied against
the passage of the bill by threatening to close down the mill. 6 The
Senators from Alaska responded to this threat by voting against the
bill, which was defeated in the Senate.6 7 Although such a threat could
be made by a similarly situated American business owner, the foreign
owner's threat may be more effective if the foreign owner is perceived
by politicians as having more opportunities to relocate and fewer loy-
alties to the local or national community.
62. Id. at 71.
63. Id. at 68-70.
64. Substantial movements in the U.S. stock market have been attributed to changes in the
investment strategies of institutional investors. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Sep. 4, 1987, at 35, col. 3
(reporting the continued downward spiral of stock prices as institutional investors took profits);
Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1987, at 6, col. 1 (reporting that performance of small stocks was affected
by the investments of institutional investors).
65. In 1986 there were approximately 100 political action committees (PACs) formed by
American companies controlled by foreign investors. M. ToLCB3N & S. TOLCMN, supra note 23,
at 16. The Federal Election Commission has approved the participation of these companies in
federal election campaigns. In his dissent in a series of commission decisions, however, Com-
missioner Thomas E. Harris argued:
[T]he PAC is always controlled by the top management of the corporation. By
permitting foreign nationals to incorporate in the U.S.... thereby [avoiding the
prohibition against foreign contributions given to U.S. political campaigns] ... the
commission does a great disservice to the congressional intention to keep foreign
influence out of federal elections in the U.S. The notion that no decisions as to the
activities of the proposed political committee will be dictated or directed by foreign
nationals strikes me as extremely naive.
Id. at 17; see N. GuicKmAN & D. WOODWARD, supra note 25, at 19-20 (discussing the problems
of losing economic and political independence in the U.S. through the growth of foreign
investment).
66. See M. TOLClIN & S. ToLcsI', supra note 23, at 19-21.
67. Id.
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More extreme exertions of political influence have been made by
governments representing the interests of nationals who have sub-
stantial investments in a host nation.6 For example, in the early 1970s,
the U.S. government became involved in the internal affairs of Chile
on behalf of American investors involved in the Chilean copper min-
ing industry. 69 On September 11, 1973, President Allende, who had
adopted a program for nationalizing foreign copper companies, 70 was
overthrown by a military junta. The U.S. government took actions
described by Allende as "an invisible financial and economic block-
ade against his government, ' 71 including a campaign to reduce bank
credits given to Chile.72 In more direct intervention, the American
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) helped finance the air strikes lead-
ing to this coup. 73
American involvement in the coup may have been precipitated
by the U.S. government's own interest as well. Although the U.S.
government had not invested directly in the Chilean copper industry,
it had used its influence with American copper companies in Chile
to obtain favorable copper contracts in the 1950s. 74 The benefits from
68. See, e.g., S. SCLE.SiN.ER & S. KmlzsR, BrrrEn Faurr: THE UNToLD SToRY oF TaE
ApEiucAN Coup rN GUATEmALA (1982) (narrating the business activities of the United Fruit
Company in Guatemala during the 1950s and the U.S.-sponsored coup undertaken to protect
those activities).
69. See A. LowENFELD, INTERNAIoNAL PRivATE INvEsTmENT (2d ed. 1982). Kennecott and
Anaconda, two large American companies, had been involved in copper production in Chile
since the early twentieth century. American capital, technology, managerial staffs, and sales
distribution networks were instrumental in the development of Chile's copper mining industry.
Id. at 91-92.
70. On September 28, 1971, President Allende issued a decree declaring that the "excess
profits" earned by the copper companies in the past would be confiscated by the government of
Chile. These excess profits amounted to $774 million. Id. at DS-170, DS-174 to -175 (citing
Measures on Deduction of Indicated Amounts in the Computation of Compensation Due to the
Major Copper Mining Enterprises Affected by the Nationalization, Decree No. 92, Sept. 28,
1971). In the decree, President Allende cited the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources passed by the United Nations in 1962. This resolution recognized "the
inalienable right of all States to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance
with their national interests." Id. (citing G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Annex 1 (Agenda
Item 39) at 59, U.N. Doe. A/5344/Add'l. A/L.412/Rev.2 (1962)). After the U.S. copper
companies took their property claims to the Chilean court, the Special Copper Tribunal ruled in
August 1972 that Allende had discretionary power to issue the "excess profits" declaration. Id.
at 152-53.
71. Id. at 174-75 (citing 27 U.N. GAOR C.2 (2096th mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2094-
2116 (1972)).
72. Id. at 174.
73. See ALLEG D ASSASSImAION PLors INvoLviNG FOmiGN LEADERS, AN INTERI REPORT
op SEN. SELEcr Comm. To SitrY GovNEAL OPTRAnoNs wrrH RESPcT TO INrT onaGENCE
AcTnTiES, S. REP. No. 465, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); P. SIomUND, TaE OvEmRTHow or
ALLENDE AND Tm Ponrncs oF CaEn, 1964-76 ch. 6 (1977).
74. In 1950, during the Korean War, the U.S. government executed agreements with
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these contracts were jeopardized by Chile's proposed nationalization
plans. The U.S. government also may have been motivated by the
insurance contracts the American-owned copper companies had under
the Investment Guaranty Program.75 Under those agreements, the U.S.
government was liable for a portion of the losses incurred by eligible
investors as a result of the expropriation or confiscation of foreign
investments by a host nation.7 6
Because of the potential political and military threats posed by
direct investments of a foreign government or its agencies, host nations
frequently have restricted these investments."
D. The Military Impact of Foreign Investment
Finally, foreign investments may threaten U.S. military defenses
by weakening the industrial base upon which the military relies for
equipment and supplies. 78 Such a threat may result from either the
transfer of secret military technologies to rival nations and the sub-
sequent loss of technological advantage, 79 or the loss, through foreign
relocation or dissolution, of domestically located companies that play
a key role in supplying or supporting military programs 0
In 1987 the Senate recognized that American industry was losing
not only the capability to respond to competitive challenges from
Kennecott and Anaconda to set the price of copper sold to the U.S. government at $0.245 per
pound. These agreements were made without any participation by the Chilean government. The
Chilean government protested because the price set by the agreements limited their tax revenues.
As a result, the copper selling agreements with the U.S. were revised to permit a price increase
and purchases by the Chilean government of copper produced by Kennecott and Anaconda. A.
LOWENFELD, supra note 69, at 95-96.
75. This program, included in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200 (1988)), provided American companies investing abroad with insurance
against losses. A. LowENFELD, supra note 69, at 117-18.
76. In addition, the U.S. government's claims would be subrogated to any claim against the
host nation by the insured. Id.
77. See, e.g., Mamco Divestiture Order, discussed infra notes 292-295 and accompanying
text.
78. C. HrrICH & R. McKEAN, Tim EcONOMICS OF DEFENSE IN TiE NucLEAR AGE 243-44
(1975). The loss of technological superiority through the sale of finished products or even
industrial espionage can thus weaken the national defense. J. ELLISON, J. FRUMKIN & T. STANLEY,
MOBILIZING U.S. INDusTRY 79-80 (1988).
79. See M. ToLCmN & S. TOLcinN, supra note 23, at 131-41 (raising concerns that current
banking regulations fail to protect against a new form of espionage whereby foreign investors
purchase banks whose clients consist of high-technology businesses in order to gain access to the
computer technology of these businesses).
80. See J. ELLISON, J. FRUMKiN & T. STANLEY, supra note 78, at 74-75 (recommending that
the government subsidize defense industries when they are unable to maintain a competitive
position).
1188 [Vol. 42
abroad, but also its ability to supply U.S. defense needs." The weak-
ening of the defense industrial base through relocation or dissolution
of a key defense industry, however, may be less threatening because
it can be managed by defense spending decisions. The economics that
govern a relocation or dissolution decision can be altered directly by
the award of a profitable defense contract or outright government
subsidies.82
E. Maintaining an Open Door Policy
In response to critics of foreign investment, proponents of an
open door policy argue that the resulting jobs, financing, and low
interest rates will strengthen the U.S. economy."3 A recent study on
the effects of foreign investment in the U.S. concluded that the ec-
onomic benefits of an open door policy outweighed any negative ec-
onomic effects.84 The study found no evidence of significant differences
in the behavior of domestic firms and foreign firms. 5 Many of the
criticisms of foreign investment are premised on the idea that a for-
eign-controlled firm will have a markedly different agenda than that
of a domestic firm.
In an international economy of nation states, the "free market
forces" of economic theory are distorted by each nation's political,
military, and economic policies. 6 A nation's concern for these pol-
81. S. REP. No. 57, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1987). In an outbreak of war the timely
provision of defense material is crucial to a successful defense. C. HrrcH & R. McKnAN, supra
note 78, at 16. The absence of sufficient capacity in a particular industry could create a bottleneck
in the expansion of war-time production. Id. at 17-18; see also J. BiAcKwEL, DETEuRENCE IN
DEcAY, NATroNAL DETENsE 38 (1989); J. ELwrsoN, J. FRbumia & T. STANLEY, supra note 78, at
68.
82. An example of a program protecting a key defense industry through government subsidies
is the initiative creating the Semi-Conductor Manufacturing Technology (SEMATECH) joint
venture between U.S. industries and the U.S. government. SEMATECH was formed to counteract
the loss of U.S. leadership in the semiconductor industry. Am FORCE ASSOCIATION & USNI
M=LrARY DATABASE, LFELiNE N DANGTn: AN AsssaNr oF THE UNIT=n STATES DEFENsE
ImusTmAL BASE 59 (1988).
83. M. ToLCmN & S. ToLcmN, supra note 23, at 25 (citing Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary
of Commerce during the Reagan Administration).
84. E. GPAmu & P. Kltuoi~A, supra note 25.
85. Graham and Krugman found that foreign-controlled firms do not "shift high-value or
high-compensation activities to their home countries, nor do they perform less [research and
development] in the United States than their U.S. counterparts." Id. at 64. The only observed
difference between foreign-controlled and American firms was the foreign firms' higher propensity
to import goods. Id.
86. The "perfect market" is a theoretical model that describes rational economic behavior
in a perfectly competitive market. Numerous sellers, who individually are unable to affect the
price of the products they sell, make up the market. Goods are produced at the lowest possible
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icies may be greater than its concern for the rational and efficient
allocation of economic resources, which is the primary benefit of an
open door policy. Thus, added production costs and other economic
inefficiencies that may result from restrictions on foreign investments
have been accepted by many nations as a reasonable cost of doing
business in an environment of competing national policies. 87
With the growth of multinational corporations, international
trade, and economic interdependence between nations, the debate over
the merits of foreign investment in the U.S. is likely to continue. The
debate identifies the problems of balancing an open door policy with
other competing policy interests such as a strong military defense, a
pollution-free environment, and a political process free from the in-
fluence of foreign investors. These problems have been addressed by
the U.S. in the past with laws restricting foreign investment; the cur-
rent debate has prompted commentators to take a critical new look
at these laws and the policies behind them.
II. The Regulation of Inward Foreign Investment
Most nations impose some regulations on inward foreign in-
vestment for a variety of economic, political, and military reasons.
The primary objective of a regulatory framework in this area is to
maximize the benefits from foreign investments while minimizing the
resulting military, political, and economic risks. The two major types
of regulations that directly restrict foreign investments are entry res-
trictions that prohibit or limit foreign ownership and investment in
particular domestic businesses88 and, at the other end of the trans-
action, restrictions on the repatriation of profits earned by foreign
investors from domestic businesses.8 9 In addition, other statutes con-
tain special reporting requirements for foreign investors.
A. Entry Restrictions
Restrictions on the foreign control of particular industries and
businesses commonly are adopted to protect military and political
price, and resources, labor, and capital are allocated efficiently. L. ScHWARTz, J. FLYNN & H.
FIRST, FREE E NTERPai'sE AND EcONOWIC ORGANIZATION: GOVERNMENT REGULATION 67-68 (6th ed.
1985).
87. Alvarez, supra note 14, at 23, 37-39.
88. Some host nations require that their nationals own a specified proportion of stock in
foreign companies. For example, India requires that an Indian national own at least 51% of
foreign companies operating in India. C. VALENTINE, supra note 24, at 78.
89. Restrictions on the repatriation of profits, which sometimes are referred to as exchange
controls, may be direct or indirect. Greece directly restricts the repatriation of profits by requiring
governmental approval of all such transfers out of Greece. The People's Republic of China has
taken a more extreme position by prohibiting all such transfers. Brazil indirectly restricts the
repatriation of profits by taxing those that exceed a specified level. Id. at 77-78.
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interests. Firms in American industries that typically are subject to
these restrictions include public utilities, communication-related bus-
inesses such as radio and television broadcasters, defense contractors,
banking firms, and those in industries involved in the exploitation of
key natural resourcesP ° Industries that are restricted to protect the
national defense generally fall into two categories. The first category
consists of industries that provide or could rapidly begin to provide
the material required by current defense plans: the defense industrial
base.91 The second category consists of essential services such as trans-
portation and radio communications. These service sectors are crucial
to the operation of the national government and the maintenance of
a healthy economy in times of peace as well as in times of military
emergency.
(1) National-Level Entry Restrictions
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 and 193692 exemplifies entry
barrier restrictions in the transportation industry. Both portions of
the Act were created to relieve the shortage of American merchant
ships during World War I; the foreign-owned merchant vessels that
previously had serviced a substantial percentage of American shippers
were unavailable and the auxiliary shipping needs of the Navy were
not always met.93 The policy statement of the Act sets out its purpose:
It is necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth
of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall
have a merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types
of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and
serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emer-
gency .... 94
This statement typifies entry restrictions justified on national security
grounds.95
There are various types of restrictions on foreign ownership in
entry barrier statutes, each with varying legislative rationales. In the
licensing of production facilities that use nuclear materials under the
90. See generally infra Appendix A.
91. J. BLAcicwuL, supra note 81, at 38.
92. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-261, 41 Stat. 988 (codified-as amended
at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 861-889 (Supp. V 1987)); Merchant Marine Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-
835, 49 Stat. 1985 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C. app. (Supp. V 1987)).
93. Kirchner, Federal Restrictions on Foreign Investment in the United States Maritime
Industries, in MmumA oF FOREIGN INvEsTmENT IN TIM UNrrMa STATES 475 (1984).
94. 46 U.S.C. app. § 861 (Supp. V 1987).
95. See, e.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1988)); Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-713 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
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Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 96 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) is prohibited from issuing a license to "an alien or any any
[sic] corporation or other entity if the Commission knows or has rea-
son to believe it is owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, a
foreign corporation, or a foreign government." 97 Other sections of
the Atomic Energy Act state the underlying policy that a license should
not be granted to "any person within the United States if, in the opin-
ion of the Commission, the issuance of a license to such person would
be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and
safety of the public." 98
While the Atomic Energy Act effectively bars foreign ownership
in industries involving nuclear power, under the Communications Act
of 193499 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is given
discretion over the decision to bar foreign ownership in the com-
munications field.0'° The prohibition in section 310(b) of the Com-
munications Act against foreign control of a broadcast, common
carrier, aeronautical en route, or aeronautical fixed radio license is
conditioned on the FCC's finding that "the public interest will be
served by the refusal or revocation of such license." 10' In a decision
that approved the potential control by a Swiss national of twenty-two
percent of the stock in the parent of a company with a common car-
rier license,' 0 2 the FCC reviewed the legislative history of the Act's
prohibition on foreign control and concluded "that although section
310(b) of the Act was directed against alien control of communi-
cations facilities, this limitation was primarily based 'upon the idea
of preventing alien activities against the government during the time
of war." ' 0 3
The Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 19200°4 contains an entry bar-
rier that discriminates against foreign investors from nations that re-
strict U.S. nationals' ownership of mineral deposits. This Act governs
the leasing of federally-owned lands with deposits of coal, oil, and
other resources to businesses for extraction purposes. Under the pro-
visions of the Act, the Secretary of the Interior is prohibited from
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1988).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1982) (footnote omitted); NRC, Domestic Licensing of Production
and Utilization Facilities, 10 C.F.R. § 50.38 (1990).
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133(d), 2134(d) (1982); NRC, Domestic Licensing of Production and
Utilization Facilities, 10 C.F.R. § 50.40(c) (1990).
99. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-713 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
100. Id. § 310(b)(4) (1982).
101. Id.
102. Data Transmission Co., 52 F.C.C.2d 439 (1975).
103. Id. at 440 (quoting 68 CoNo. REc. 3037 (1927)).
104. Act of Feb. 25, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-146, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1988)).
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granting leases to aliens'05 whose nation "den[ies] similar or like priv-
ileges to citizens or corporations of [the U.S.]."' 6 This reciprocity
provision has not been interpreted to require the nation of the foreign
investor to grant identical leasing privileges to U.S. citizens. °7 Rather,
the Department of Interior -applies internally developed criteria to
determine if "similar or like privileges" are granted to U.S. citizens
by the particular foreign nfation.0°
Some entry restrictions on foreign investments are justified on
political and economic grounds that go beyond traditional notions of
national security. An example is Canada's Foreign Investment Review
Act (FIRA), which was adopted in order to "maintain effective con-
trol over [the Canadian] economic environment."109 Under FIRA for-
eign investments in the form of an acquisition or establishment of a
foreign-owned business were reviewed and approved by a national
regulatory body.Y0 This Act was passed at a time when foreign inves-
105. The prohibition also applies to U.S. domestic corporations that are controlled by foreign
persons. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1988).
106. Id.; Bureau of Land Management, Leases, Permits & Easements, 43 C.F.R. § 3102.2
(1988).
107. Marans & Rusch, Federal Restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment in Energy Resources,
in MANUAL OF FoemGN INv sn r N hmE UNr=D STATES, supra note 93, at 443-44.
108. See Status of Great Britain as a Reciprocal Country Under the Mineral Leasing Act of
February 25, 1920, 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 476, 481 (1936).
109. Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46, 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619 (repealed 1985); see
accompanying regulations at S.O.R. 1974-154, Mar. 7th, 1974, P.C. 1974-477, Mar. 5th, 1974,
at 1033-52. The regulatory framework established under the Foreign Investment Review Act is
similar to the E.xon-Florio Amendment's review procedures. See Foreign Investment Review Act,
ch. 46, 1973-74 Can. Stat. 619 §§ 9-11 (repealed 1985). Foreign acquisitions were reviewed by
an agency that passed its recommendations to the Cabinet. Id. § 12. The Cabinet made the final
decision regarding approval of such acquisitions.
Foreign acquisitions with gross assets exceeding a minimum threshold were subject to the
jurisdiction of FIRA. Foreign ownership constituting control for purposes of FIRA was ownership
of 50 or more of the voting shares of a public company or 20% or more of the voting shares
of a private company. Id. § 3(3)(b).
Commentators attribute passage of the Act to the political movement for Canadian independ-
ence and unity. Franck & Gudgeon, Canada's Foreign Investment Control Experiment: The Law,
the Context and the Practice, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 76, 78 (1975). American economic and cultural
dominance in Canada was viewed as a significant force in perpetuating the political rift between
the English and French communities in Canada. Id. at 78-84.
110. The standards of review used in evaluating these foreign investments included the
following:
(1) the effect on employment, resource processing, exports and consumption or
utilization of Canadian goods and services,
(2) the degree of Canadian participation in the new business and the industry in which
the new business is a part,
(3) the effect on productivity, industrial efficiency, technological development, product
innovation and product variety,
(4) the effect on competition within any industry(ies) in Canada, and
(5) the compatibility with national industrial and economic policies.
Id. § 2(2). In addition, FIRA provided a major exemption for existing firms in Canada at the
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tors owned thirty-four percent of all corporate assets in Canada."'
At that time there was much public reaction in Canada against U.S.
investments, which constituted the largest portion of foreign invest-
ment in Canada." 2 During the period in which FIRA was in effect," 3
approximately fifteen percent of proposed foreign investments in
Canada were rejected by the Cabinet." 4 The decisions made under
FIRA were seen by some commentators as politically based, reflecting
the viewpoint of the political party in power." 5
(2) State-Level Entry Restrictions
In the U.S. restrictive entry barriers also can be found at the state
level." 6 Since the states are not responsible for the national defense,
these restrictions are justified on economic and political grounds sim-
ilar to the goals of Canada's FIRA. State barriers to foreign own-
ership and control primarily affect real property ownership, which is
largely a matter of state law. 1 7 State laws restrict the ownership of
time of its enactment. See Franck & Gudgeon, supra note 109, at 111-12. These firms were
permitted to expand their existing operations without Cabinet approval. Id. at 111 n.183. During
the 1970s, approximately 75% of the annual growth in foreign controlled business assets resulted
from investments in existing operations. See id. at 111-12.
111. COMMrIrEE TO STUDY FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. OF THBE SECTION OF CORPORATION,
BANKING & BusnrEss LAW OF r=n AMEIciAN BAR AssOCIATION, A GuiDE To FOREIGN INVESTMENT
249 (A. Roth ed. 1979). In 1972 U.S. investors accounted for 78% of all foreign investments in
Canada. A breakdown of foreign investment by sectors consists of the following: 99.9% in
petroleum industry; 95% in automotive industry; 90% in rubber and computers; and 60% in
other manufacturing and resource industries. Id. Although historically Canada was the recipient
of significant foreign direct investments, the growth rate of such investments increased 600%
between 1950 and 1970. Murray, FIRA: Its Origins and Purpose, in CuirENT LEGAL ASPECTS
OF DOING Busurss IN CANADA, supra note 22, at 5.
112. Canadian public opinion polls reflected growing sentiment against further increases in
U.S. investments in Canada. Persons polled by Gallup who stated that there was "enough" U.S.
investment increased from 46% in 1964 to 71% in 1975. Murray, supra note 111, at 4. Some
of this sentiment has been attributed to U.S. government actions prohibiting Canadian companies
owned by U.S. parent corporations from selling goods to communist bloc nations. See id. at 7-
9.
113. The Act (ch. 46, 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619) was repealed with the enactment of the
Investment Canada Act (ch. 20, 1985 Can. Stat. 419) on June 20, 1985, after Brian Mulroney
was elected Prime Minister. H. STIKEMAN & R. ELIOTT, DOING BusINEss IN CANADA § 3.02
(1988).
114. M. ToLcHIN & S. ToWcHN, supra note 23, at 211.
115. Grover, The Foreign Investment Review Act Phase 1, 1 CAN. Bus. L.J. 54, 59 (1977);
see also M. ToLcIN & S. TOLCHIN, supra note 23, at 211. Similar to the Exon-Florio Amendment,
the ultimate Cabinet-level decision under FIRA was not discretionary and subject to judicial
review. Franck & Gudgeon, supra note 109, at 132.
116. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.2 (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.221(2)
(West 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 710.02 (West Supp. 1989).
117. Brodkey, Restrictions on Foreign Investment in Real Property, in MANuAL OF FOREGN
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land by nonresident aliens. These laws vary in their restrictions. Some
either prohibit the ownership of agricultural lands" s or limit the
amount of agricultural land that can be owned." 9 Others prohibit
nonresident aliens from owning any type of land and require the dis-
position to a U.S. resident of any land acquired by a non-resident
alien through devise or descent.' 20 Some of these statutes apply the
same restrictions to domestic corporations that are controlled by ali-
ens.' 2' Many states, however, permit land ownership by alien-con-
trolled corporations if they formally qualify to do business in the
state.'2
In addition to regulating real estate, many states have attempted
to regulate the takeover of resident businesses by foreign investors. 2 3
Frequently, however, these statutes are invalidated on federal con-
stitutional grounds.' The Ohio legislature passed this type of pro-
tective legislation in 1988, requiring foreign businesses to file an
application for approval of a proposed acquisition with the Ohio De-
partment of Development.as The Act provided for a state agency re-
INv'smmENT n; TH UNITED STATES, supra note 93, at 501. State laws restricting land ownership
are passed in agricultural states to protect farmers. See, e.g., ANN. STAT. § 442.560 (Vernon
1986).
118. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 567.2 (West Supp. 1990).
119. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 41 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
120. See, e.g., OxaA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 121-127 (West 1971).
121. Nebraska law treats a domestic corporation as an alien person if: (1) the majority of
the capital stock is held by aliens; (2) the majority of corporate directors are aliens; or (3) the
executive officers are aliens. NEn. Rnv. STAT. § 76-407 (1981).
122. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 293-A:4(IV-V), 293-A:108 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14A:3-1(1)(d) (West Supp. 1990); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1307 (McKinney 1986).
123. Greene, Securities Related Legal Factors in Planning a United States Acquisition by a
Foreign Purchaser, in MANuAL oF FOREGN INvEsTmENT.N THE UNmrE STATES, supra note 93,
at 153. State takeover statutes are designed to protect incumbent management in hostile takeovers.
See, e.g., Atiz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202(a) (1990 & Supp. 1991); Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §
271B.12-210 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
124. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (invalidating the Illinois Business
Takeover Act as a violation of the commerce clause); National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687
F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (invalidating the Missouri Takeover Bid Disclosure Act); Natomas Co.
v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981) (invalidating the Nevada Takeover Bid Disclosure
Law on supremacy clause grounds).
125. Ohio Foreign Business Acquisitions Act, Omo Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 1710.01-.05 (Baldwin
1988) (repealed 1988). This Act required approval from the Ohio Department of Development
for any acquisition of resident businesses by a business that was organized outside of the U.S.
and did not have existing substantial interests in Ohio. The acquiring foreign business was
required to file an application for approval with the Department of Development that contained
the following data: (1) details of the financing arrangements for the acquisition, including any
plans for sale or disposition of assets of the resident business; (2) the acquisition's anticipated
effect on employment and general economic activity in Ohio; (3) the acquisition's anticipated
effect on the tax revenue of Ohio and its political subdivisions; and (4) the acquisition's anticipated
effect on the production of goods in, and export of goods from, Ohio. Id. § 1710.03(A)(l)-(4).
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view to determine if the acquisition would be detrimental to the citizens
of Ohio. In Campeau Corp. v. Federated Department Stores, 26 a fed-
eral district court found that the Act violated the commerce clause
because its regulation of only certain foreign acquisitions was per se
discriminatory and its definition of resident business was too broad. 27
The California Insurance Commissioner also was equally un-
successful in rejecting the takeover of a California insurance company
by a foreign owned corporation, BATUS.1 28 The California statute
prohibited government-owned and -subsidized insurers from com-
peting with California insurers, 29 and approximately ten percent of
BATUS stock was held by several foreign governments. Unlike the
Ohio Act, however, the California regulation was not invalidated. In
interpreting the regulation, the superior court held that the mere own-
ership of shares by a foreign government was not prohibited if such
ownership did not conflict with the purposes of the regulation. 30
(3) Defining Foreign Control of Domestic Corporations
Many entry restriction statutes have vague definitions of "foreign
control" with respect to U.S. domestic corporations that have foreign
stockholders. Difficulty in obtaining proof of the citizenship of stock-
holders in a large public corporation heightens the problem. In en-
acting entry restriction provisions, Congress often expressly states a
percentage of stock ownership above which control is presumed. Gen-
erally, the statutes define a twenty percent to twenty-five percent stock
ownership as establishing foreign control of a domestic corporation.' 3 '
126. 679 F. Supp. 735 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
127. The court found that the regulation of "resident" businesses could potentially result in
a multiplicity of inconsistent state statutes that regulated companies carrying on business in
several states. Id. at 739.
128. D. HELENLAx & T. FARRELL, DEVELOPMmENTs i TE LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS:
CRoss BORDER TRANSACTIONS, 620 PRACTICING LAW INST., corp. 143 (Nov. 3, 1988) (citing
BATUS Inc. v. Gillespie, No. C-690081 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Aug. 5, 1988)).
129. CAL. INS. CODE § 699.5 (Deering Supp. 1981). The statute provides in relevant part: "A
certificate of authority shall not issue to any insurer owned, operated, or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by any other state, province, district, territory, or nation or any governmental
subdivision or agency thereof." Id.
130. The purpose of the regulation was threefold: (1) to prevent government-owned and -
subsidized insurers from competing with unsubsidized private insurers; (2) to prevent the presence
of any sovereign immunity in an admitted insurer; and (3) to avoid security problems resulting
from an insurer's access to confidential information regarding its insured policyholders. D.
HELENIAK & T. FARRELL, supra note 128; see BATUS, Inc., No. C-690081 (Los Angeles Super.
Ct., Aug. 5, 1988).
131. For example, this level of stock ownership is specified in the Federal Communications
Act of 1934, see 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4) (1982) (more than 25%); id. § 310(b)(3) (more than
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In addition to the level of stock ownership, Congress has ex-
pressly specified that other factors, such as the presence of foreign
directors or a foreign chief executive officer, indicate foreign con-
trol. 1 2 The Federal Communications Act defines foreign control based
on any one of the following: (1) a company officer is an alien; or
(2) more than one-fourth of the directors are aliens; or (3) more than
one-fourth of the capital stock is owned of record or voted by aliens
or their representatives, by a foreign government or its representative,
or by a corporation organized under the laws of a foreign country.13
Regulatory agencies, however, have not always followed the stat-
utory definitions of foreign control strictly. For example, the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) adopted a functional control test that sup-
ported a finding of foreign control, even for cases in which the min-
imum ownership requirement of the Federal Aviation Act was not
met.13 4 In Interamerican Airfreight Co., the CAB refused to renew
an indirect air carrier permit held by a California freight forwarder
because an alien stockholder held twenty-five percent of the stock in
the company and had close connections with the company's other
stockholders. 35 The CAB held that the Federal Aviation Act barred
alien control as well as foreign ownership of more than twenty-five
percent of the company's capital stock. 36
Some statutes, like the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,137 do not
contain a statutory definition for control. Instead, both the courts
and regulatory agencies have imposed criteria for determining con-
trol.138 The court in No Oilport! v. Carter39 upheld the Interior De-
partment's grant of a lease to a pipeline company owned by Getty
Oil Company on the ground that foreign ownership of twenty-six per-
cent of the parent company's stock did not constitute control over
the pipeline company."40 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has
used a set of legal presumptions in making leasing decisions. Foreign
control is conclusively presumed if more than fifty percent of the vot-
20%); and regulations under the Shipping Act of 1916, see Citizen Requirements for Vessel
Documentation, 46 C.F.R. § 67.03-9(b) (1989) (25%). In calculating the percentage of foreign
stock ownership, the stock held by all foreign shareholders is aggregated. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)
(1982); 46 C.F.R. § 67.03-9 (1989).
132. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4) (1982).
133. Id.
134. Interamerican Airfreight Co., Foreign Permit, 58 C.A.B. 118, 119-20 (1971).
135. Id. at 120.
136. Id. at 120-21.
137. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1988).
138. Marans & Rusch, supra note 107, at 449-51.
139. 520 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
140. Id. at 360.
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ing stock is held by a foreign stockholder. 4 1 Conversely, if any un-
related domestic individual or entity owns a larger percentage of stock
than the foreign stockholders, it is conclusively presumed that the
foreign stockholder does not hold a controlling interest. Finally, for
cases in which the foreign stockholder owns less than fifty percent
of the voting stock either alone or in combination with another related
stockholder, the BLM may specify a percentage of ownership at which
a rebuttable presumption of control is adopted. 142
This set of presumptions and other applications of statutory def-
initions of foreign control recognize that a simple control rule based
on a minimum level of equity ownership is not always adequate.
Rather, a multi-factor control rule like that found in the Commu-
nications Act or a determination based on the facts of each case often
is needed.
(4) Defining Foreign Control of Defense Industries
Another area in which the issue of foreign control must be settled
is the defense industry. Although Congress has not expressly restricted
foreign investment in the defense industry, the Department of Defense
has adopted guidelines for granting security clearances to defense con-
tractors controlled by foreign investors. 43 Under the Defense Indus-
trial Security Regulations, contractors who need access to classified
information must meet specific requirements to obtain necessary se-
curity clearances.'" The contractor must be "organized . . .under the
laws of the U.S. or Puerto Rico" and must not "be under foreign
ownership, control or influence (FOCI)."' 145 The determination of
"foreign ownership, control or influence" is a discretionary decision
based on a variety of criteria, including:
(1) foreign direct or beneficial ownership of five percent or more
of the contractor's securities; (2) the extent to which foreign interests
hold management positions or control or influence the contractor's
directors, officers or executives; (3) the extent of a company's con-
tracts with or indebtedness to foreign interests; (4) the existence of
revenues from foreign interests that exceed ten percent of gross in-
come; (5) the existence of revenues from Communist countries; (6)
141. See Marans & Rusch, supra note 107, at 451.
142. Id.
143. Department of Defense, Industrial Security Regulation, Directive 5220.22-R (Jan. 1983)
[hereinafter Industrial Security Directive]; see Comment, The Regulation of Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States Defense Industry, 9 Nw. J. ITr'L L. & Bus. 658, 666-68 (1989)
(authored by Mark L. Hanson).
144. Industrial Security Directive, supra note 143, §§ 2-202 to -205.
145. Id. § 2-201(a).
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interlocking directors with foreign interests; or (7) any other evi-
dence indicating foreign control or influence over the contractor and/
or foreign access to sensitive information.'6
Existing defense contractors who become subject to foreign owner-
ship, control, or influence are given the opportunity to keep their
defense contacts by restructuring the company to eliminate foreign
owners or creditors or by adopting a plan that prevents associated
foreign parties from gaining access to classified information. 147
When a FOCI contractor is unable to restructure or adequately
protect classified information, the Department of Defense can make
an exception to the bar against such contractors. Generally, these ex-
ceptions are based on treaty agreements with the foreign investor's
home nation or business arrangements that essentially limit foreign
control over the operations of the contractor.'4 An example of the
type of treaty that permits a FOCI contractor to obtain a security
clearance is a Reciprocal Industrial Security Agreement. Such an
agreement requires that the signatory nations grant certain levels of
security clearances to each other's nationals. A FOCI contractor ob-
taining a security clearance under this type of agreement must obtain
a security assurance document from the nation of its foreign owners
in order to qualify for a U.S. security clearance. 49
A variety of business arrangements have been accepted by the
Department of Defense as sufficiently mitigating the FOCI status of
a contractor to warrant a security clearance. 50 These include board
resolutions certifying that foreign shareholders and their represen-
tatives will neither have access to classified information nor hold po-
sitions of authority or influence over the performance of classified
contracts.' 5' The Department of Defense also has accepted the es-
tablishment of voting trusts and irrevocable proxy agreements that
effectively give the voting rights of the stock held by foreign share-
holders to U.S. citizens. 52
146. Id. § 2-202.
147. See Barton & Peterson, Industrial Security Clearances: Heightened Importance in a
World of Corporate Acquisitions, Takeovers, and Foreign Investment, 18 PUB. CoNMACT L.J.
392, 400-01 (1987).
148. Industrial Security Directive, supra note 143, § 2-205.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. § 2-205(a).
152. The voting trust agreement transfers the legal title in the foreign investor's stock to a
U.S. citizen who functions as a trustee. The trustees are persons who have no past connections
with the foreign investor that might cause them to be influenced by the foreign investor. Id. §
2-205(b).
Under an irrevocable proxy agreement, the foreign investor retains legal title in the stock. The
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Defense contractors with security clearances are subject to pe-
riodic security inspections by Defense Department officials."3 If an
inspection reveals that a contractor's security procedures are inade-
quate or that there is immediate danger of classified information be-
ing compromised, the contractor's security clearance may be revoked
or suspended.5 4 Ultimately, a revocation will lead to termination of
classified contracts and confiscation of all classified materials held
by the contractor.115
In the past, U.S. entry restrictions on foreign investment gen-
erally have been limited in accordance with the U.S. open door policy.
Moreover, as part of the movement under the Reagan Administration
to deregulate certain sectors of the economy, past restrictions on for-
eign ownership have been lifted in such industries as commercial avi-
ation. 56 Thus, today foreign controlled corporations may register their
aircraft in the U.S. if they can show that they are lawfully qualified
to do business in the U.S. and the aircraft is used primarily in the
U.S.157
B. Other Restrictions
In addition to entry restrictions on domestic businesses controlled
by foreigners, nations regulate inward foreign investment through re-
patriation laws, special reporting laws, and antitrust and securities
laws.
(1) Repatriation and Tax Laws
Restrictions on the repatriation of profits are imposed indirectly
through the host nation's tax laws and directly through specific laws
that limit the amount of earnings a foreign-controlled company can
take out of the host nation. In the twentieth century, primarily third-
world nations have adopted direct laws restricting the repatriation of
profits.5 8 The main justification for such restrictions is economic.
U.S. citizen proxy holders, however, retain the voting rights or management power associated
with the stock. Id. § 2-205(c).
153. See Barton & Peterson, supra note 147, at 403-05.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See generally infra Appendix A.
157. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1401(b) (1988).
158. Commrr=rE FOR EcoNoMIc DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH AND POLICY CoMM=Errra, FINANCE
AND THIRD WORLD ECONoMIc GROWTH 124 (1987). As a result of political pressure supporting
the national control of nonrenewable natural resources, foreign direct investment in third-world
nations has moved from investments in the extraction and processing of raw materials to
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Typically, the host nation has adopted policies for developing do-
mestically-controlled businesses and alleviating its balance of payment
problems. 5 9 Limitations on the repatriation of the foreign investor's
profits will result in additional capital that can be used to further these
policies.
U.S. laws restricting the repatriation of foreign capital and re-
lated earnings include the International Emergencies Economic Pow-
ers Act (IEEPA),160 the Trading With the Enemy Act,'16 and federal
and state tax laws. Both IEEPA and the Trading With the Enemy
Act delegate to the President broad power to regulate foreign in-
vestments. 62 Although IEEPA does not confer the power to expro-
priate foreign property, the powers delegated under IEEPA have been
construed broadly by the courts. 63 Before the President can exercise
the powers delegated by the Trading With the Enemy Act, Congress
must declare war. 64 Similarly, the powers delegated by IEEPA cannot
be exercised by the President unless a state of national emergency has
been declared. 65
Recent administrations have exercised the power over foreign in-
vestments granted by the authority of these statutes. In 1984 an action
by the Reagan Administration prohibiting transactions with Cuba in-
volving general tourist and business travel was upheld by the Supreme
Court even though there was evidence that a recent amendment to
the Trading With the Enemy Act proscribed such action during peace-
time.' 66 In January 1981, pursuant to IEEPA, President Carter trans-
manufacturing and service-related industries. Id. at 338-39. In addition, new ownership schemes
and contractual relationships such as joint ventures between the foreign investor and local
nationals have arisen in response to a change in the balance of economic and political power in
favor of the host nation. Id.
159. D. COLmAN & F. NIXON, EcoNoMIcs oF CHANGE iN LEss DEvaroPED CouirNRis 347 (2d
ed. 1986).
160. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988); see infra note 232.
161. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 5(b) (West 1990).
162. The Trading With the Enemy Act authorizes the President to take "title to foreign
property, regulate a purely domestic transaction, regulate gold or bullion, and seize records."
Id. §§ 1-44. With the exception 'of the powers authorized under the Trading with the Enemy
Act, see H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1977), the IEEPA authorizes the President
to "regulate, . . . void, . . . or prohibit ... [the] exercising of any right, power, or privilege
with respect to any property in which any foreign country ... has any interest by any person
... subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 50 U.S.C. §§ 1702(a)(1)(B) (1988).
163. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (holding that the grandfather clause of
IEEPA permitted the President to continue old embargoes against Cuba, North Vietnam, and
China); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding the executive orders
implementing the hostage release agreement with Iran); Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966).
164. 50 U.S,C.A. app. § 2 (West 1990) (defining "enemy" for purposes of the statute).
165. See National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1651 (West 1990).
166. Wald, 468 U.S. at 227-30.
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ferred four billion dollars of Iranian assets held by banks in the U.S.
and eight billion dollars of Iranian assets held by U.S. banks abroad
to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in order to implement the
Iranian Hostage Agreements.167 President Reagan later used his pow-
ers under IEEPA to suspend claims pending in U.S. courts against
Iranian assets, nullify all prejudgment attachments against Iranian
assets, and transfer all Iranian assets in U.S. banks to Iran. 16 Pres-
ident Reagan also used his IEEPA powers to freeze assets of the gov-
ernments of Libya169 and Panama. 170
Courts have been reluctant to review the validity of a President's
declaration that an emergency exists under the National Emergency
Act.' 7' Nor have courts given much force to provisions of the IEEPA
that give Congress control over presidential actions. 172 As a result of
this deference to presidential powers, states of national emergency
pursuant to IEEPA and the National Emergency Act have been main-
tained for years .173
In the absence of a national emergency or declaration of war,
legal restrictions on the repatriation of foreign capital and earnings
are limited generally to federal and state tax laws. Under federal in-
come tax laws, several categories of foreign investment earnings are
taxable. These include income that is "effectively connected" with
the foreign entity's conduct of a trade or business in the U.S., 74 in-
come from a U.S. source that is not "effectively connected,"'' 75 and
167. Exec. Order No. 12,277, 46 Fed. Reg. 7915 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,278, 46 Fed.
Reg. 7917 (1981). For a discussion on whether President Carter's transfer of Iranian assets
amounted to an expropriation or vesting of title in violation of the provisions of IEEPA, see
McLaughlin & Teclaff, The Iranian Hostage Agreements: A Legal Analysis, 4 FoRDHtAM INT'L
L.J. 223 (1981).
168. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 665-66 (1981).
169. Exec. Order No. 12,544, 51 Fed. Reg. 1235 (1986), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988).
170. Exec. Order No. 12,635, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,134 (1988), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701
(1988).
171. See, e.g., Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding
that the determination whether Nicaragua posed a sufficient threat to warrant President Reagan's
declaration of a national emergency was a nonjusticiable question), aff'd on other grounds, 814
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).
172. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating the legislative veto).
173. See Notice to Continue Exec. Order No. 12,170, 54 Fed. Reg. 46,043 (1989) (extending
national emergency in Iraq until November 13, 1990); Notice to Continue Exec. Order 12,635,
54 Fed. Reg. 14,197 (1989) (extending national emergency in Panama until April 7, 1990); Note,
The International Emergency Economics Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Control
Presidential Emergency Power, 96 Hv. L. REv. 1102, 1104 (1983).
174. "Effectively connected" income is taxed at the same graduated income tax rates
applicable to U.S. persons. 1 Fed. Taxes (P-H) 45,767 (2d ed. 1990).
175. This income, which includes interest, dividends, periodical gains, and fixed or determin-
able 'annual or periodical gains, profits, and income, see I.R.C. § 871(a) (1988), is taxed at the
lower of a flat 300 rate or a rate set by treaty. 1 Fed. Taxes (P-H), supra note 174, 1 45,767.
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income from the disposition of U.S. real estate interests. 176 In addition
to federal taxes, foreign investment earnings and property are subject
to state taxes. Some states have adopted a unitary tax formula for
calculating the income taxes of multinational enterprises. 7 7 Under this
formula, a percentage of the corporation's world-wide earnings is tax-
able based on the portion of property, payroll, or sales attributable
.to the state. 7
(2) Special Reporting Laws
Several federal statutes authorize government agencies to collect
data on foreign investments. 7 9 After significant increases in foreign
investment in the U.S. during the early 1970s, Congress adopted the
International Investment Survey Act of 1976 (IISA)180 and the Ag-
ricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 (AFIDA) 8' to
supplement existing foreign investment reporting. These statutes re-
quire certain foreign persons and businesses to provide the federal
government with data on their U.S. investments. The collected data
is compiled to develop reports and statistics that are used as a basis
for governmental decision making. 82
The Commerce and Treasury Departments are responsible under
IISA for securing current data on international capital flows and de-
veloping statistical reports on foreign direct and portfolio investments
in the U.S.8 3 Under IISA's regulations, information on foreign direct
investment is collected for cases in which a foreign controlling interest
in a domestic corporation or unincorporated business exceeds ten per-
176. 1 Fed. Taxes (P-H), supra note 174, 45,767. This income is taxed according to the
same tax rules applicable to U.S. persons. I.R.C. §§ 871-872 (1988). U.S. property interests are
broadly defined as the "fee ownership and co-ownership of lands or improvements on it,
leaseholds of lands or improvements on it, and options to acquire such ownerships or leaseholds."
I.R.C. § 897(c)(1)(A) (1988).
177. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 43.20.031 (1990); CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§ 25128, 25129,
25132, 25134 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.13 (West Supp. 1984).
178. See Note, Standing Under Commercial Treaties: Foreign Holding Companies and the
Unitary Tax, 97 HAxv. L. REv. 1894, 1894 (1984).
179. See, e.g., Foreign Investment Study Act, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (1974)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) note (1988)) (authorizing comprehensive study of foreign invest-
ment); Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975).
180. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1988).
181. 7 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3508 (1988)..
182. See id. § 3504 (describing mechanism for reporting to Congress and the President under
AFIDA); 22 U.S.C. § 3103 (1988) (describing Benchmark Survey Reports on Foreign Direct
Investment under IISA).
183. Exec. Order No. 11,961, 42 Fed. Reg. 4321 (1977). The information collected for these
reports is subject to confidentiality provisions. 22 U.S.C. § 3104(c) (1988). Only aggregate data
is given to other government departments. 15 C.F.R. § 806.5 (1990).
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cent. 18 4 Reporting requirements under IISA are imposed on a variety
of parties including foreign persons, U.S. affiliates of foreign per-
sons, and any business enterprise directly or indirectly controlled by
a foreign person.185 The regulations impose monetary penalties for
failing to report as required. 8 6
The AFIDA was enacted in response to growing concern over the
escalating values of agricultural land.8 7 Under AFIDA, data is col-
lected from foreign persons who directly or indirectly hold "a sig-
nificant interest or substantial control" of entities that own U.S.
agricultural land. 8 A ten percent or greater interest constitutes "a
significant interest" under the Act if the interest is held by a single
alien individual, foreign government, or other foreign legal entity; if
there are multiple foreign owners, "a significant interest" is found
only when a ten percent or greater interest is held by separate foreign
owners who act in concert with respect to the interest. 89 Real estate
interests that are not subject to AFIDA reporting requirements in-
clude security interests such as mortgages, leases of fewer than ten
years, certain noncontingent future property interests, contingent fu-
ture interests, and easements unrelated to agricultural production.1'g
AFIDA's regulations require foreign persons holding the prescribed
interests to disclose their identity and furnish a description of the real
property interest that includes the original purchase price and current
value.' 91 Failure to satisfy these reporting requirements can result in
monetary penalties based on the fair market value of the interest in
agricultural land. 92
In spite of the multiple statutes that authorize the collection of
data on foreign investments, critics have charged that current reports
and data are inadequate both for determining the extent of foreign
184. 22 U.S.C. § 3102(10) (1988).
185. For definitions of entities subject to IISA, see id. § 3102; 15 C.F.R. § 806.15 (1990).
The IISA regulations require the following types of reports: (1) Initial report on a foreign
person's acquisition, establishment, or purchase of the assets of a U.S. business, id. § 806.150)(3);
(2) annual report on foreign direct investments in the U.S., id. § 806.14(0; (3) quarterly report
on transactions between foreign parent and a U.S. subsidiary when the foreign parent holds a
10% or greater interest in the subsidiary, id. § 806.14(e); (4) benchmark survey report (every five
years), id. § 806.150)(1).
186. Id. § 806.6; see Trooboff, Federal Reporting Requirements for Foreign Direct Investment
in the United States, in MANA. ON FoREIGN INVESTMENT N THE UNrrED STATES, supra note 93,
at 263-64.
187. Trooboff, supra note 186, at 226.
188. 7 C.F.R. § 781.2(k) (1990); see Trooboff, supra note 186, at 227-28.
189. 7 C.F.R. § 781.2(k) (1990).
190. Id. § 781.2(c); see Trooboff, supra note 186, at 233.
191. 7 C.F.R. § 781.3(e)(4)-(6) (1990).
192. Id. § 781.4.
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investment and for developing reasoned policies toward foreign in-
vestment.' 93
In 1988 Senator John Bryant, a Democrat from Texas, tried to
remedy these problems by introducing a bill' 94 that would have ex-
tended the Commerce Department's reporting requirements to include
foreign persons who acquired an interest of five percent or more in
U.S. real estate or a U.S. business. 9 In addition; Senator Bryant's
bill would have required the disclosure of more detailed information
by foreign persons who held a twenty-five percent or greater interest
in a U.S. business. This bill was intended to solve the perceived "data
gap" hindering assessment of foreign investment in the United States.' 96
The bill did not pass. 197
Critics have noted specifically that statistics collected understate
the amount of foreign investments in the U.S. because only book
values are reported, not market values. In addition, some statistics
do not reflect the funds raised by foreign investors with bank loans
or securities sales.198 Critics also claim that the lack of detailed data
on new jobs created by foreign investments distorts the employment
benefits attributable to such investments.'99
(3) General Domestic Laws
Finally, in addition to laws specifically targeting foreign invest-
ment, general business regulations such as the antitrust and securities
laws also regulate foreign investment in the United States.20 Although
193. Foreigners' Use of Assets, Not Ownership, Should Be Weighed, Treasury Official Says,
6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 104 (Jan. 25, 1989); M. Totcmm & S. ToLmcH, supra note
23, at 244-45.
194. Foreign Ownership Disclosure Act, H.R. 312, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
195. This is lower than the 10% ownership threshold adopted by AFIDA and IISA. See
supra text accompanying notes 183-189.
196. See Trade Bill Compromise on Acquisitions Reached, Progress Made on FCPA Amend-
ments, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 471 (Mar. 30, 1988).
197. The Bush Administration's Bureau of Economic Analysis did not support it, claiming
that current data collected was "sufficient for policy-making purposes and for use ... in assessing
the economic impact of foreign investment on the economy." Id. at 470-71. Former Secretary
of Commerce Elliott Richardson called the proposed reporting requirements "discriminatory,
burdensome, and bad public policy." Id. at 471.
198. M. TOLCIN & S. To.cmN, supra note 23, at 276; A. QuuANo, A GumaE TO BEA
STATISTICS ON FoamG DmcT INvEsTmENT rN TH UNrrnm STATES, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
ANALYsis, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY Op CuRRENT Busnmrss (Feb. 1990).
199. In particular, current employment statistics do not indicate the number of new jobs in
real terms (net of domestic jobs lost from foreign investment) that are directly attributable to
foreign investment. See N. GucEmAN & D. WooDwARD, supra note 25, at 133-39.
200. A foreign investor acquiring an existing U.S. firm will be subject to § 1 and § 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988), § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1988), and the
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these laws generally do not discriminate as a matter of policy against
foreign investors, 20' they sometimes impose additional reporting re-
quirements and consider the foreign status of a business owner as a
factor in the decisionmaking process. 0 2 U.S. trade laws also have a
significant impact on direct foreign investments. Tariff duties and
quotas imposed on goods imported into the U.S. will encourage for-
eign producers to invest in production facilities within the U.S. in
order to circumvent the tariff duty. 203 Conversely, with the reduction
of tariff duties and quotas, foreign investments may be replaced by
increased imports into the U.S.
Export restrictions also may encourage foreign investments in
U.S. production facilities and other businesses in order to obtain ac-
cess to the restricted goods or technology. 204 Such investments would
undermine trade restrictions meant to protect national security. The
Export Control Act of 1949205 and the Export Administration Act of
1969206 were enacted to control the export of goods considered stra-
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). The extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust
laws was recognized in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945),
in which Judge Hand wrote that "any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within
its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the
state reprehends." Id. at 443.
201. Past policy guidelines promulgated by the Justice Department focused on the effect of
an acquisition by foreign investors on competition in the U.S. market. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JusTcE, ANTTRUST Div., ANTITRUST GuIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 16 (1977). No
special significance was given to the fact that the acquirer was a foreign national. Id. at 18; see
also Davidow, Antitrust International Policy and Merger Control, 15 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 519,
522 (1981).
202. For example, business conduct by a foreign exporter must have a "direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable affect" on U.S. domestic commerce, imports, or exports before it
can be challenged under the antitrust laws. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-290, §§ 401-403, 96 Stat. 1233, 1246 (1982).
203. M. KEnaNiN, supra note 24, at 392-93.
204. The Secretary of Defense during the Reagan Administration, Caspar Weinberger, stated
at a press conference that the Soviets were systematically acquiring protected technological
information from U.S. high-technology manufacturers, research centers, universities, and defense
contractors. M. ToLcIN & S. ToLcHiN, supra note 23, at 138. One Soviet scheme for acquiring
technological secrets involved plans to purchase California banks holding loans with high-
technology companies. Id. at 131-41.
205. Pub. L. No. 81-11, §§ 2, 3(a), 63 Stat. 7, 7 (1949) (formerly codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2021-2032 (expired Dec. 31, 1969)). This Act imposed a two-tiered system of export licensing
consisting of a "general license" for a large class of goods and a "validated license" for strategic
goods. See A. LowENFELD, TRADE CoNroIs FOR PoI~mcAL ENDs 6 (1977). For discussion of
this statute and its amendments, see Berman & Garson, United States Exports-Past, Present,
and Future, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 791 (1967).
206. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1976) (expired on Sept. 20, 1979); see To Extend and
Amend the Export Control Act of 1949: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 272 (1969). This statute and its
amendments liberalized controls on exports. Horan, Statutory Improvements to the Foreign
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tegic to U.S. national defense. This purpose was expanded in 1962
by an amendment to the Export Control Act requiring denial of an
export license for any item that "makes a significant contribution to
the military or economic potential" of any nation threatening the
"national security and welfare of the United States." 207 The drafters
believed that exporting goods without reviewing their military and
economic significance adversely affected U.S. national security. 28
In the post-World War II era, export control statutes also were
motivated by cold war politics. 2 9 In 1949, the U.S. and its western
allies formed the "Consultative Group," 210 an informal multinational
forum established to discuss trade controls. One product of the Con-
sultative Group was the formulation of embargo lists that restricted
exports to certain communist nations. 211
In the 1970s as a result of the lessened tensions between the U.S.
and communist countries, U.S. export policy changed. 212 With amend-
ments to the Export Administration Act in 1977,213 Congress dis-
carded its cold war policy regarding exports214 and increased the
significance of the foreign availability factor in export licensing de-
cisions. 215 The foreign availability consideration supports granting an
Availability Process for High Technology National Security Export Controls, 27 VA. J. INT'L L.
575, 578 (1987).
207. Export Control Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-515, § 4, 76 Stat. 127, 127
(emphasis added).
208. Id. § 2.
209. During the 1950s, the export control system effectively restricted the export of military
and industrial materials to communist countries. See A. LowvmenwD, supra note 205, at 6.
210. This was a voluntary organization composed of the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, West Germany, and'others. Berman & Garson,
supra note 205, at 834-35.
211. Id. at 835 & n.180.
212. In a National Academy of Sciences study on U.S. national security export controls,
three competing goals were cited as underlying the U.S. export control program:
(1) to promote the economic vitality of Free World countries; (2) to maintain and
invigorate domestic technological bases; and (3) to promote cooperation with allies in
impeding the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries in their efforts to acquire
western technology that can be used directly or indirectly to enhance their military
capability.
PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF NAIONAL SEcuIUTy CoNTRoLS ON INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANs-
FER, COMMI=TEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND PUBLIC PoLIcY, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ScIENcEs,
BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREsT: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY EXPORT CoNTROLs AND GLOBAL
ECONOMIC COMP TON 1 (1987).
213. Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977).
214. Id. § 103(a), 91 Stat. 235, 235-36; H.R. REP. No. 190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4,
reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADnmN. Naws 362, 364-65.
215. Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 103(a), 91 Stat. 235, 235-36 (1977) (amending 50 U.S.C. app. §
'2403(b)(2) (1976)); H.R. REP. No. 190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977). The foreign availability
factor was not considered in licensing decisions under the Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L.
No. 81-11, 63 Stat. 7 (expired in 1969).
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export license for goods that are available without restriction from
foreign sources. 216
Even after the 1977 amendments, export licenses frequently were
not granted for goods despite their availability outside the United
States. 217 In response to this problem, Congress passed the Export
Administration Act of 1979.218 Provisions of the Act made it easier
for exporters to show that goods were available from foreign sources219
and established a more comprehensive regulatory framework for ad-
ministering export controls.22° The new procedures for establishing
foreign availability, however, often were not used by exporters of high
technology goods because they believed that foreign availability ap-
plications would not be seriously considered by the Department of
Defense. 221
The policy statement of the 1979 Act added a new dimension to
export policy. Although no absolute right to export was granted to
U.S. citizens, support for an open international trade policy was a
fundamental goal.222 Economic reasons for this change in policy in-
216. Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 103(a), 91 Stat. 235, 236 (1977) (amending 50 U.S.C. app. §
2403(b)(2) (1976)). Section 103(a) states that
[t]he President shall not impose export controls for national security purposes on the
export from the United States of articles. . . which he determines are available without
restriction from sources outside the United States in significant quantities and com-
parable in quality to those produced in the United States, unless the President determines
that ... the absence of such controls would prove detrimental to the national security
of the United States.
Id.
217. McQuade, U.S. Trade with Eastern Europe: Its Prospects and Parameters, 3 LAW &
PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 42, 74 (1971).
218. Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp.
III 1985)).
219. Id. § 5(f)(1), 93 Stat. 503, 509 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f)(1) (Supp. III 1985)).
220. See generally Comment, The Export Administration Act of 1979: An Examination of
Foreign Availability of Controlled Goods and Technologies, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 179 (1980)
(authored by Shirley M. Duorin).
221. Letterman, United States Regulation of High Technology Exports, 20 INT'L LAW. 1147,
1149 (1986); see also Evrad, The Export Administration Act of 1979: Analysis of its Major
Provisions and Potential Impact on United States Exporters, 12 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 14 (1982)
(discussing the unpredictability of export control policy resulting from too much executive
discretion over the granting of export licenses).
222. The declaration of policy included:
(1) It is the policy of the United States to minimize uncertainties in export control
policy and to encourage trade with all countries with which the United States has
diplomatic or trading relations . ..
(2) It is the policy of the United States to use export controls only after full
consideration of the impact on the economy of the United States and only to the
extent necessary-
(A) to restrict the export of goods and technology ... which would prove detrimental
to the national security of the United States;
(B) to restrict the export of goods and technology where necessary to further
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cluded the adverse effects of a restrictive export policy on domestic
employment and U.S. balance of payments.m The provisions of the
Act that support a more open trade policy include the development
of control lists identifying goods and technologies subject to export
controls, 224 expedited licensing procedures when similar goods and
technologies are available from foreign sources, 225 and an annual time
limit on any export controls maintained on foreign policy grounds. 226
The effectiveness of the current export policies in meeting na-
tional security objectives will depend partly on U.S. controls of for-
eign investment in the goods and technologies on the control lists.
Without proper investment controls, foreign investors who own eq-
uity interests in the firms producing these goods and technologies may
access the protected commodities and thereby undermine the purposes
of the export restrictions. What foreign investors cannot obtain from
U.S. exports, they might seek through direct investment in domestic
U.S. enterprises.
I. The Exon-Florio Amendment
Despite the assortment of U.S. regulations governing inward for-
eign investment, during the 1970s and 1980s critics urged that Con-
gress adopt more regulations to protect U.S. economic and military
security. 227 William Casey, Director of the CIA during the Reagan
Administration, warned that foreign investments in the U.S. engi-
neering and technology sectors represented a potential "Trojan
horse. '"m The semiconductor industry, for example, not directly pro-
tected by federal laws, was viewed as vulnerable to foreign acquisition
significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared international
obligations; and
(C) to restrict the export of goods where necessary to protect the domestic economy
from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the serious inflationary
impact of foreign demand.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (Supp. III 1985).
223. Id. § 2401(2).
224. The control list is developed by the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce. Id. § 2403.
If industry representatives have requested participation in the control list formulation, the Secretary
of Commerce must organize and consult with a technical advisory committee composed of
representatives of industry, the intelligence community, and the Departments of Commerce,
Defense, and State. Id. § 2404(c)(4), (h). Retaining particular goods and technologies on the
control list must be justified by the executive branch every six months. Id. § 2404(c)(6)(A)-(B).
225. Id. § 2404(e)(5).
226. Id. § 2405(a). Although an export control maintained for foreign policy purposes can
be extended by the President, the President must file a report with Congress justifying the
extension on grounds specified in the Act. Id. § 2405(b), (f).
227. See M. Tor.cmN & S. ToLcanr, supra note 23.
228. U.S. Fears, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1987, sec. 6, at 63, col. 1.
April 1991] EXON-FLORIO AMENDMENT
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
given the U.S. budget and trade deficits and the decline in the value
of the dollar. 229 The increase in the growth rate of foreign investments
during the 1970s and 1980S230 along with the high visibility of foreign
acquisitions 23 1 led to the passage of the Exon-Florio Amendment in
1988.
Supporters wanted the Amendment to fill the regulatory gap in
U.S. law that permitted foreign acquisitions and takeovers of U.S.
domestic businesses without consideration of the national security im-
plications of foreign control over the acquired business. 23 2
The regulatory authority of the Exon-Florio Amendment is lim-
ited to merger and acquisition transactions occurring after the
Amendment was enacted. 233 Some critics argue that the Amendment
is not sufficient to alleviate the foreign investment threat since the
more than 100 U.S. businesses acquired by foreign investors at prices
in excess of $100 million during 1986 and 1987 remain virtually un-
affected. 2 4 Moreover, as for acquisition transactions subject to the
Amendment, once a transaction has been reviewed but no action taken
within the time frame mandated by the statute, the Amendment pro-
vides for no further regulatory action. 235
229. In response to the proposed Fujitsu-Fairchild merger, Commerce Secretary Badridge
announced that the Commerce Department would investigate the public policy implications of
the transaction. Auerbach, Cabinet to Weigh Sale of Chip Firm, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1987, at
El; see supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
230. See supra note 1 (Commerce Department figures). The total value of foreign direct
investments in the U.S. during the 1970s as reported by the Commerce Department were: 1970-
$13.3; 1971-$13.7; 1972-$14.3; 1973-$18.3; 1974-$22.4; 1975-$27.7; 1976-$30.8; 1977-
$34.6; 1978-$42.5; 1979-$52.3 (figures rounded to nearest billion dollars). BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSis, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE SURVEY OF CURRENT BusnraSS Table 1 (Foreign Direct
Investment in the U.S., August 1973-1976) (Aug. 1980).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
232. This perceived gap resulted in part from the 1977 amendment to the Trading With the
Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 5(b) (West 1990), that limited actions under the Act to wartime
situations only. See supra text accompanying note 164. At about the same time as the 1977
amendment, the IEEPA was passed. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. This Act gives
the President regulatory authority over international economic transactions during "national
emergencies." The IEEPA, however, does not give the President the powers over foreign property
that were available under the prior version of the Trading With the Enemy Act. See 50 U.S.C.A.
app. § 5(b) (West 1990).
233. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (1988).
234. See M. ToLCIHN & S. TOLCEN, supra note 23, at 8. Due to the decline in the value of
the U.S. dollar in those years, American businesses and real estate became a bargain to foreign
investors. N. GuIcK, N& D. WooDwARD, supra note 25, at 115.
235. Completed merger and acquisition transactions remain subject to the Exon-Florio Amend-
ment until the CFIUS or the President reviews and approves them. The President's powers under
the Amendment with respect to an investigated transaction terminate 15 days after the investigation
has been completed. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b) (1988). Congress intended that this timetable be
enforced strictly. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 576, supra note 9, at 925, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADM:N. NEws 1547.
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The Amendment establishes an acquisition review process that
is triggered by the filing 6f foreign acquisition data with the CFIUS.2 6
The CFIUS has thirty days initially to review each filed acquisition.
After the thirty days, the CFIUS must decide if a full-scale inves-
tigation is warranted.2 7 If it decides not to conduct an investigation,
the CFIUS's authority over the transaction and foreign-controlled
business terminates.233 If the CFIUS decides to investigate the trans-
action, it must do so within forty-five days. After the investigation
and within seventy-six days of the initial filing date, the CFIUS must
submit to the President its recommendation on the foreign acquisi-
tion. 9 After receiving this recommendation, the President has fifteen
days to order the Attorney General to prohibit the acquisition or, if
the transaction has been completed, to divest the foreign owner of
its ownership interest. Although filing notice of a transaction with
CFIUS is voluntary under the proposed regulations,2'4 foreign inves-
tors are likely to file notice to avoid the risk of divestiture. 2
A. National Security Standard
The House version of the Exon-Florio Amendment reflected con-
cern over the consequences of foreign investment affecting both na-
tional defense and the U.S. competitive position in high-technology
industries. 243 This version gave the President authority to restrict for-
eign acquisitions, mergers, and takeovers of U.S. businesses engaged
in interstate commerce that threaten "to impair national security and
essential commerce.'24 Although the "essential commerce" standard
was eliminated by the Conference Committee, the broad scope of
regulatory authority established by the Exon-Florio Amendment sug-
gests that it may not be limited by traditional notions of national
security.245 The third factor in paragraph (e) of the Amendment rec-
236. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)-(c) (1988).
237. Id. § 2170(a).
238. Proposed Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign
Persons § 800.502, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,744 (1989) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800) (proposed
July 14, 1989) [hereinafter Proposed Regulations].
239. Id. § 800.504.
240. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (1988); Proposed Regulations, supra note 238, § 601.
241. Proposed Regulations, supra note 238, § 502.
242. See Dennin, supra note 16, at 375; Liebeler, Yet Another Reason Not to Invest in the
U.S., Wall St. J., Aug. 30,, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
243. H.R. Cow. REP. No. 576, supra note 9 at 926.
244. See id. at 925.
245. The scope of the Amendment is delimited by the defiition of foreign control over a
U.S. business and the types of businesses that are subject to the authority of the Amendment.
Under §§ 800.301 and 800.210 of the proposed regulations, this scope is quite broad. Proposed
Regulations, supra note 238.
April 1991] EXON-FLORIO AMENDMENT
ommends that the President consider "the control of domestic in-
dustries and commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects the
capability and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements
of national security."" Both this factor and the adoption of an un-
defined national security standard give the President broad discretion
in defining which industries and sectors of the economy have a stra-
tegic role in the nation's security. 247
Additionally, the Amendment does not require the President to
consider the powers authorized under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)m when deciding if national security
is threatened by a proposed acquisition, which further supports the
interpretation of the Amendment as expanding the definition of na-
tional security.249 Although presidential authority under the IEEPA
is limited to periods when a national emergency has been declared, 250
its purpose-to protect national security by regulating international
investment transactions-is similar to the purpose of the Exon-Florio
246. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (1988). Paragraph (e) of the Amendment recommends, but
does not require, that the President consider several factors in deciding whether a particular
acquisition may impair national security. These factors are:
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements,
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense
requirements, including the availability of human resources, products, technology,
materials, and other supplies and services, and
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens as
it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of
national security.
Id.
247. See H.R. CorF. REP. No. 576, supra note 9, at 926. Most of the submitted comments
on the proposed regulations focused on "the fact that there is no definition of national security"
in the Amendment itself or its regulations. Stephen Canner, staff chairman of the CFIUS, said
at a panel discussion that "[tireasury officials ... believe that national security [is] a concept
that 'defies definition."' Final Exon-Florio Rules May be Ready in Several Weeks, Treasury
Official Says, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1265 (Oct. 4, 1989).
248. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988). After declaring an emergency pursuant to the provisions
of § 1701, the President is authorized to take the following actions:
(A) investigate, regulate or prohibit -
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments ... to the extent that such transfers or payments
involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities; and,
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation
or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with
respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest.
Id. § 1702.
249. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d) (1988).
250. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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Amendment. By permitting the President to ignore the protections
provided by the IEEPA in assessing the national security threat posed
by an acquisition, some acquisitions may be blocked unnecessarily.
Essentially, the President may assume that in a national emergency
he will not be authorized to prohibit the relocation abroad of a key
defense contractor or the export of needed goods and foreign owned
assets (actions actually authorized by the IEEPA). Presidents have
taken actions under the IIEPA that included freezing and transferring
foreign-owned assets. 251 Thus, the IEEPA has become an integral part
of the legal protections that maintain our national security. The Exon-
Florio Amendment's preclusion of the IIEPA in the President's as-
sessment of the national security threat posed by a foreign acquisition
distorts any national security standard adopted by the CFIUS under
the Amendment.
The national security standard and review procedures included
in the Amendment are similar to the provisions of the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962, which regulates imports. 2 Under that Act, the
factors that must be considered by the President in determining whether
national security is threatened primarily relate to the economic well-
being of the U.S. defense industrial base. 253 Additional statutory lan-
guage, however, requires the President to consider the effects of im-
ports on the domestic economy and "whether such weakening of our
internal economy may impair the national security. ' 254 This factor
reflects the broader view that national security in some cases means
the security of the national economy.
Section 1862(c) of the Trade Expansion Act has been used in the
past by Presidents to adjust imports of petroleum and petroleum
products by imposing quotas and import fees. On January 23, 1975,
251. In response to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, President Carter froze Iranian assets in the
United States. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1979). Later, as part of the settlement
with Iran, President Reagan, who ratified the agreements negotiated by the outgoing administra-
tion, suspended claims by U.S. citizens pending in American courts and nullified prejudgment
attachments against Iranian assets. Exec. Order Nos. 12,276-12,283, 3 C.F.R. 105-14 (1981);
McLaughlin & Teclaff, supra note 167. The Supreme Court upheld these actions in Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
252. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1988).
253. These factors include
the domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements, the
capacity of domestic industries to meet such requirements, existing -and anticipated
availabilities of the human resources, products, raw materials, and other supplies and
services essential to the national defense, the requirements of growth of such industries
and such supplies and services including the investment, exploration, and development
necessary to assure such growth.
Id. § 1862(d).
254. Id.
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after an investigation by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to
section 1862(c), President Ford issued a proclamation that raised im-
port fees on imported oil by increasing the fee per barrel by up to
three dollars. 25 A constitutional and statutory challenge to this action
by eight states was unsuccessful; the Supreme Court, citing the leg-
islative history of section 1862(c), held that the imposition of license
fees was authorized under that section. 2 6 In reviewing the case, the
Court did not address the merits of the President's discretionary de-
cision that American dependence on foreign oil during the early 1970s
threatened the national security.
If the Exon-Florio Amendment as implemented under the pro-
posed regulations receives the same deference from the Court as the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, foreign investors will continue to be
subject to the uncertainty implicit in the undefined national security
standard.2 17 Without a clear policy statement that describes the type
of investments that impair U.S. national security, both foreign inves-
tors and domestic businesses are subject to a significant new risk that
proposed acquisition and merger transactions may not be approved
by the President or that completed acquisitions may be subject to a
future divestiture.
B. Entities and Transactions Subject to the Exon-Florio Amendment
The potential for regulation over broad sectors of the economy
is reflected in the proposed regulations for implementing the pro-
visions of the Exon-Florio Amendment.2 58 These regulations define
255. Exec. Proc. No. 4341, 40 Fed. Reg. 3965 (1975).
256. Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559 (1976). The Court
stated that the congressional re-enactment of § 1862(c) with no material changes in its language
after President Nixon had invoked the provision to initiate an import license fee system reflected
the intent that such fee systems could be used by the President to adjust imports. Id. at 570.
257. Until the CFIUS adopts clearer guidelines on what types of transactions may impact
national security, the foreign investor will have difficulty anticipating the consequences of a
CFIUS review.
258. At the time of this writing, the proposed regulations have not been approved. During
the public comment period, which ended on September 12, 1989, Liebeler, Yet Another Reason
Not to Invest in the United States, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1989, at 10, col. 3, over 500 pages of
comments were received by the Treasury Department from more than 70 commentators. ABA
Section Examines Consequences of Exon-Florio on Merger Counseling, 59 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1480 (Aug. 23, 1990). The commentators included law firms, trade associations,
business groups, foreign companies, and U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies. Daily Rep. for
Exec. (BNA) No. 161 (Aug. 22, 1989). Comments included suggestions that the regulations
should: (1) increase public disclosure of CFIUS actions in order to establish a "precedent" or
"no action" file that would provide some guidance on CFIUS decision-making; (2) exclude joint
ventures and foreign lenders from the transactions covered by the Amendment; (3) establish some
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the jurisdiction of the Amendment based on the contacts the acquired
business have with U.S. interstate commerce,2 9 the type of trans-
action proposed,26 and the existence of foreign control.261
As a threshold matter, the Exon-Florio Amendment covers
entitiesZ 2 with business activities in interstate commerce in the U.S.263
The broad definition of entity, however, which includes any "branch,
partnership, associated group ... trust, corporation, division of a
corporation, business enterprise, or other organization (whether or
not organized under the laws of any State), and any government, ' 264
gives the Amendment far-reaching jurisdiction. For example, under
the regulations, multinational corporations and other foreign busi-
nesses that operate a branch in the U.S. may become subject to the
Exon-Florio Amendment review process. This broad definition, which
disregards both the form and ownership of an organization, attempts
to regulate acquisitions such as the 1988 proposed acquisition of Fair-
child Semiconductors by Mitsubishi. 261
Falling under the Exon-Florio Amendment's review process are
not only transactions that "will result" in foreign control, but also
transactions that "potentially result" in foreign control. 266 Thus, a
foreign acquisition conditioned on retaining U.S. nationals on the
board of directors is subject to review and disapproval under the pro-
posed regulations. This more expansive definition of control may be
an attempt to compensate for the Amendment's lack of ongoing au-
thority over foreign-controlled businesses after the review process has
been completed.
The proposed regulations identify five categories of transactions
subject to the Exon-Florio Amendment:
1) completed transactions which did or could result in the foreign
control of a U.S. business; 2) tender offers under which a foreign
person offers to buy a substantial portion of the shares of a U.S.
business; 3) proposed or completed acquisitions by foreign con-
minimum threshold for triggering the Amendment's provisions; (4) establish a fast track procedure
for reviewing transactions that are clearly unlikely to threaten national security; (5) allow the
parties to appeal an adverse decision; and (6) provide adequate compensation to a buyer in the
event of a forced divestiture. Id.
259. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 238, § 800.201.
260. See id.
261. See id. § 800.213.
262. See id. § 800.206.
263. See id. § 800.201.
264. Id. § 800.206 (emphasis added).
265. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
266. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 238, § 800.301. The proposed regulations define
a U.S. person as any entity that has business activities in U.S. interstate commerce, irrespective
of the nationality of the individuals who control it. Id. § 800.210.
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trolled U.S. companies of other U.S. companies, irrespective of
whether the target companies are U.S. controlled or foreign con-
trolled; 4) joint venture agreements which could result in a foreign
person gaining control over a U.S. business; [and) 5) proxy soli-
citations that could result in foreign control of a U.S. person. 267
Transactions that are not subject to review are acquisitions made
solely for the purpose of investment, simple sales of assets (as op-
posed to the sale of a business), and transactions that do not result
in a change of control. 26 Examples of acquisitions made solely for
investment purposes include a passive investment in which the in-
vestor does not own more than ten percent of the stock, stock pur-
chases made by institutional investors (e.g., banks, trust companies,
and insurance companies) in the ordinary course of business, acqui-
sitions of convertible voting securities that do not involve control, 269
and joint ventures in which the U.S. partner retains voting control
over business decisions. 270 Finally, the latter group of transactions
include acquisitions of stock from a stock split or mergers that main-
tain the same percentage of foreign ownership (e.g., merger of two
subsidiaries of the same foreign owner).2 71
A transaction falling within one of the five categories specified
by the proposed regulations also must satisfy the foreign control test
of section 213 before it is subject to the Exon-Florio Amendment.
The control test "focuses on the power, whether or not exercised, to
formulate, determine, direct, or decide important matters relating to
the entity. ' 272 These matters include:
(a) the sale, lease, mortgage, pledge or other transfer of any or all
of the principal assets of the entity, whether or not in the ordinary
course of business; (b) the dissolution of the entity; (c) the closing
and/or relocation of the production or research and development
facilities of the entity; (d) the termination or non-fulfillment of con-
tracts of the entity; or (e) the amendment of the Articles of In-
corporation or constituent agreement of the entity with respect to
the matters described at (a) through (d) above. 273
The basis for such control can be significant stock ownership,
a contractual relationship, or other business arrangement. According
to the proposed regulations, however, transactions may be subject to
267. Id. § 800.301.
268. Id. § 800.302.
269. As defined by the proposed regulations, a convertible security is a "voting security
which currently does not entitle its owner or holder to vote for directors of any entity." Id. §
800.218.
270. Id. § 800.302
271. Id.
272. Id. § 800.213.
273. Id.
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the review process even when the foreign owner only acquires a mi-
nority ownership interest.274 In addition to the proposed regulations,
the CFIUS has provided foreign investors with a questionnaire that
gives some guidance for determining if a proposed acquisition is sub-
ject to investigation. The questionnaire specifies some of the factors
that are examined in the review process .275 These factors suggest that
the CFIUS is interested in those businesses that currently have or plan
to have a significant U.S. market share in sensitive technologies, hold
substantial defense contracts, or are positioned to impact on suppliers
of defense-related goods. The questionnaire asks for data on future
business plans as well as current business operations. This prospective
inquiry reflects the speculative nature of the decisionmaking process
under subsection (d) of the Amendment, which is based on a finding
that the foreign owner "might take action that threatens to impair
the national security.' '276
The Departments of Defense and Energy published a list of
twenty-two technologies deemed critical to the technological superi-
ority of U.S. weapon systems, providing more guidance in identifying
acquisitions that may be blocked under the Amendment. 277 This list
was published pursuant to a recent statute requiring those depart-
ments to identify technologies that should receive special consider-
ation in government spending decisions. 278
Although the CFIUS is interested only in receiving filings of
transactions that present a bona fide issue relating to national se-
274. Thus, a foreign person with a minority interest that cannot affect the types of decisions
described in § 800.213 nonetheless may be subject to the provisions of the Exon-Florio Amend-
ment. Id.
275. 50 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 965, 966-67 (Dec. 12, 1988). The questionnaire
asks for the following types of information: (1) identification of the transaction and the parties
including the foreign investor (these questions pertain to the jurisdictional requirements of the
Exon-Florio Amendment); (2) information on the market share of the acquired business and
effect of the acquisition on U.S. suppliers of similar products or services; (3) information on
any technologies acquired as a result of the transaction, any defense contracts held by the
acquired business, and any research and development activities undertaken by the acquired
business for the Defense Department; and (4) information on the business plan of the foreign
investor vis-,-vis the acquired business, specifically, plans relating to defense contracts, defense-
related goods, research and development, and the introduction of new technologies. In addition,
the likely effects of the business plan on suppliers and customers of the acquired business are
requested. Id.
276. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(d) (West 1990).
277. Tolchin, Crucial Technologies: 22 Make the U.S. List, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1989, at
DI, col. 4. The technologies listed include biotechnology, laser weapons technology, and composite
materials for aircraft. The criteria for selecting the listed technologies were: (1) "an ability to
significantly enhance the performance of proven types of weapon systems"; (2) "a potential for
creating new capabilities or systems"; (3) "a potential for improving the reliability, availability
and 'maintainability' of weapons systems"; and (4) "'affordability."' Id.
278. Id.
April 19911 EXON-FLORIO AMENDMENT
curity, the filing procedures may be used as a self-serving defensive
weapon by the target management in hostile takeovers. By filing no-
tice of a proposed acquisition with the CFIUS, the target management
can gain a thirty- to ninety-day delay279 and expose the foreign in-
vestor to the disclosure requirements of the Amendment's review
process.280
The effect of this review process on investment risk is amplified
by existing antitrust regulations, namely the Hart-Scott-Rodino An-
titrust Improvements Act,28' which authorizes the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) to review proposed acquisitions that may have anti-
competitive effects. Information must be filed on proposed trans-
actions that meet the "size of person" test 28 2 and will result in the
acquiring party's ownership of either fifteen percent of the stock or
stock valued at fifteen million dollars or more in the acquired busi-
ness. 2 3 Although certain transactions are exempted, 2 4 most acqui-
sitions meeting the size thresholds are subject to review. 285
In addition to the risk of disapproval by the FTC, parties to a
transaction covered by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act are subject to a
fifteen- to thirty-day waiting period after filing the required infor-
mation. 2 6 In a hostile takeover or a cooperative transaction in which
279. From the date of filing notice, the CFIUS and the President have 30 days to decide
whether to investigate the reported transaction. Investigations must be completed within 45 days.
At the end of the investigation, the President has 15 days to decide whether the transaction
should be blocked. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a), (c) (1988).
280. Liebeler, supra note 258, § 1, at 10, col. 3. Under the proposed regulations, parties who
may file notice with the CFIUS of a proposed transaction include the target company and the
acquiring party. Notice also may be filed by government agencies and members of Congress. See
Proposed Regulations, supra note 238, § 800.401. Shareholders are not considered parties to the
acquisition but shareholders or other nonparties may informally contact the CFIUS regarding a
particular transaction. Such informal notice does not constitute notice for purposes of the
regulations and thus does not start the review process. Id.
281. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988). The rules implementing the provisions of the Act are found at
16 C.F.R. §§ 800-803.90 (1990).
282. This test requires that at least one of the two parties to the transaction have sales or
assets valued at $100 million or more and the other party have sales or assets valued at $10
million or more. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (1988).
283. 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(h)(1) (1990).
284. The exemptions include: (1) additional purchases of stock or other interests by a party
who already owns 50qo or more of the acquired entity; (2) acquisitions made solely for investment
that result in the acquiring party's ownership of less than 10% of the stock of the acquired
entity; (3) acquisitions made solely for investment by certain institutions; and (4) transactions
that specifically are exempted from antitrust laws by statute and are approved by a federal
agency. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c) (1988).
285. See S. Lomi, AcQuIsmoNs AND MERGERS §§ 6.01-.06 (1989).
286. If a transaction is a cash tender offer, the waiting period is 15 days and begins after
the information is filed. Other transactions are subject to a 30-day waiting period. If more
information or documents are requested after filing, the waiting period is extended another 20
days. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e) (1988).
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there are competitive acquirers, the waiting period can have critical
implications. 287 During the delay between disclosure of a bid and con-
summation of the acquisition transaction, the price of the acquired
company's stock will increase.288 Since the Amendment's review proc-
ess presents risks similar to those under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act,
transactions subject to both FTC and CFIUS review will incur sub-
stantially longer delays, greater disclosure requirements, and a risk
of disapproval on two independent grounds. Moreover, the same dif-
ficulties presented by the Hart-Scott-Rodino review process are pres-
ent in the Amendment review process.
C. Enforcement of the Exon-Florio Amendment
The Bush Administration has been conservative in using its au-
thority under the Exon-Florio Amendment to block foreign acqui-
sitions. From its enactment through September 1990, only one out -
of approximately 460 acquisitions filed with the CFIUS have been
blocked by the President.2 9 Only a few of the acquisition transactions
reviewed by the CFIUS have been subject to complete investiga-
tions.290 Of these, the CFIUS rarely has recommended that a trans-
action be prohibited. 291 More commonly, the CFIUS informally
287. Herzel & Shapiro, Negotiated Acquisitions: The Impact of Competition in the United
States, 44 Bus. LAW. 301, 301 (1989).
288. On average, this short-term price increase in response to a bid amounts to 30% of the
stock price prior to the bid's announcement. Id.
289. These figures were cited by Stephen Canner, the Director of Treasury's Office of
International Investment. Foreign Investment: Sen. Gore Blasts Administration for Approach to
Exon-Florio Amendment, 197 Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. A-8 (Oct. 11, 1990).
290. See Turza & Essaye, New Foreign Investment Provision Has Potential for Broad
Restriction: The Exon-Florio Amendment, 37 Fr. BAR NEws & J. 146 (Mar./April 1990).
291. The following transactions subject to full investigations were approved by the President:
(1) Monsanto Acquisition by Heuls (West German). The target company, Monsanto Electronic
Materials Co. (Monsanto) was the largest U.S. producer of silicon wafers in 1988 when the
acquisition was proposed. Tolchin, Monsanto Unit Sale Faces Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21,
1988, at 3D, col. 1. The Department of Defense was concerned that the transaction might
undermine the SEMATECH project, an industry and government joint venture to develop
technologies for the domestic semiconductor industry, and consequently notified the CFIUS of
the proposed transaction. Id. In addition to the Defense Department, 29 congresspersons urged
President Bush to block the transaction pursuant to the Exon-Florio Amendment. Congressmen
Ask Bush to Block Sale of Wafer Maker to West German Firm, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA)
No. 23 (Feb. 6, 1989). President Bush decided not to block the transaction, however, after
reviewing the potential impact on the supply of silicon chips, technology transfer, and SEMA-
TECH. Farnsworth, Bush Won't Block Chip Unit's Sale, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1989, at Dl, col.
1.
(2) General Ceramics Acquisition by Tokuyama Soda Co., Ltd. (Japanese). The target company,
General Ceramics, produced ceramic products that included electronic components contained in
nuclear weapons. 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 339 (Mar. 15, 1989). At the time of the proposed
April 1991] EXON-FLORIO AMENDMENT
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
negotiates conditions to the proposed acquisition with the parties to
the transaction. In February 1990, however, based on a unanimous
vote of the CFIUS, President Bush ordered a Chinese company to
divest its ownership interest in Mamco Manufacturing of Seattle, a
manufacturer of metal parts for civilian aircraft. 292 The official jus-
tification for the divestiture order was to protect against the export
of restricted technologies that were considered critical to the national
security. 293 The Chinese company, China National Aero-Technology
Import and Export Corp., was a purchasing agent for a Chinese gov-
ernment agency involved in research and development of military air-
craft, missiles, and aircraft engines. Critics of the divestiture order
called it "a politically motivated use of a law intended to safeguard
acquisition, General Ceramics had a classified contract with the Oak Ridge Y-12 Weapons Plant,
an Energy Department facility that refined plutonium and uranium for use in nuclear warheads.
Id. After CFIUS informally notified the parties that it would recommend to the President that
the transaction be blocked, the parties temporarily abandoned the merger transaction until General
Ceramics sold off its defense operations to another company. Turza & Essaye, supra note 290,
at 149; see 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 491-92 (Apr. 19, 1989).
(3) Westinghouse Electric Corp. Joint Venture with Asea Brown Boveri, Ltd. (Swiss). A joint
venture between Westinghouse Electric Corp. and Asea Brown Boveri to manufacture electrical
transmission and distribution transformers, relays, and capacitors for markets in the United
States, Brazil, and Argentina was reviewed by the CFIUS because of the potential for Swiss
control over the enterprise. Turza & Essaye, supra note 290, at 149. A provision of the joint
venture agreement gave Asea Brown Boveri the right to acquire Westinghouse's 55% interest.
Id. The Departments of Defense and Commerce were concerned over the potential limitation on
the U.S. supply of electrical transformers. Id. After the CFIUS received assurances that electrical
transformers would continue to be manufactured in the U.S., President Bush decided not to
block any future exercise by Asea Brown Boveri of its buyout option. Id.
(4) Fairchild Divisions Acquisition by Mantra (French). The target divisions, Fairchild Com-
munications & Electronics Co., Fairchild Control Systems Co., and Fairchild Space Co., produced
aerospace systems and spacecraft. 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1096 (Aug. 23, 1989); Daily Rep.
for Exec. (BNA) No. 161 (Aug. 22, 1989). In addition, they had U.S. defense contracts. Id. The
Commerce Department was concerned about the export of Fairchild's sensitive technologies and
requested a CFIUS investigation. Id. After Matra developed a comprehensive export control
management system that was approved by the Commerce Department, President Bush decided
not to block the transaction. Id.
(5) Unisoft Corp. Acquisition by CMC, Ltc. (Indian). The target company, Unisoft Corp., a
U.S. subsidiary of a British software firm, specialized in customized applications for Unix
computers. Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 86 (May 3, 1990). The Defense and Commerce
Departments were concerned that Unisoft's technology for encrypting data prior to data trans-
mission might be exported as a result of the acquisition and consequently notified the CFIUS of
the proposed acquisition. Id. President Bush decided not to block the transaction based on a
unanimous recommendation from the CFIUS. Id.
292. Order Pursuant to Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 55 Fed. Reg.
3935 (Feb. 1, 1990). This divestiture was ordered three months after the acquisition transaction
was completed. One commentator noted that the delay in blocking the acquisition may have
resulted in the technology transfer that the divestiture order was intended to prevent. President
Invokes Exon-Florio, supra note 18, at 226.
293. 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1452 (Feb. 8, 1990); see Alvarez, supra
note 14, at 95-98.
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national security." 294 The Bush Administration tried to downplay the
significance of the order by reaffirming its open door policy toward
foreign investments. 295
Nonetheless, as a result of the Bush Administration's failure to
adopt clear guidelines that define the national security standard under
the Exon-Florio Amendment, the new risks posed by the Amendment
remain significant factors in foreign investment decisions. Moreover,
the lack of a clear national security standard has transformed the
debate over foreign investment into a debate over the interpretation
of the Amendment. 296 In urging the Bush Administration to block
Nippon Sanso KK's acquisition of a division of Hercules, Inc., which
installs systems that supply industrial gases to the semiconductor in-
dustry, Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee asserted that the Exon-Flo-
rio Amendment was broad enough to cover the acquisition.297 Senator
Gore supported the use of the Exon-Florio Amendment to block the
acquisition because the Hercules, Inc. division supplied SEMATECH,
a cooperative effort between the U.S. Defense Department and the
U.S. semiconductor industry aimed at regaining leadership in the in-
ternational semiconductor industry. 298 John Niehuss, Senior Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, supported approval of the ac-
quisition and argued that Exon-Florio is not the "appropriate ve-
hicle" to address concerns over the health of the U.S. semiconductor
industry. 2 9 A third view on the coverage of the Amendment was ex-
pressed by William Rudman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Trade Security Policy. He stated that because the Hercules, Inc. di-
vision was "not the last U.S. supplier of the leading-edge equip-
ment[,J ... a necessary criterion in the assessment as to whether
national security is at risk," the Department of Defense did not object
to the acquisition.3 °°
Congressional dissatisfaction with the Bush Administration's in-
terpretation and implementation of the Exon-Florio Amendment has
294. One Treasury Department official claimed that although Mamco owned machinery subject
to export restrictions, the company had no access to secret information. Rosenthal, Bush Cancels
China Purchase of U.S. Firm, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 3, 1990, at 1, col. 6.
295. Marlin Fitzwater, a White House spokesman, stated, "The President's action in this
case is in response to circumstances of this particular transaction." Id. at 16, col. 3.
296. Foreign Investment: Sen. Gore Blasts Administration for Approach to Exon-Florio
Amendment, 197 Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. A-8 (Oct. 11, 1990).
297. Senator Gore criticized the Bush Administration as having an "incredibly lackadaisical"
view of the CFIUS process and as lacking the will to implement the Amendment. Id.
298. After an investigation into the possibility that proprietary SEMATECH information
would be disclosed to the acquired company, the CFIUS obtained assurances from Nippon Sanso




led to proposals for further amendments. 0' On September 19, 1990,
the House Energy and Commerce subcommittee approved a bill in-
troduced by Representative Doug Walgren of Pennsylvania that would
broaden the scope of Exon-Florio by modifying the language of par-
agraph (d).302 This modification would authorize the President to block
a foreign acquisition if there is "credible evidence that it is likely that
the national security might be impaired by the effect the merger, ac-
quisition, or takeover could have on the industrial and technology
base of the United States." 3 °3 In addition, the bill would require all
CFIUS member agencies to identify technologies essential to the U.S.
industrial and technology base. The Secretaries of Commerce and De-
fense also would be required to identify those transactions filed with
the CFIUS that involve the identified technologies. 304
Congressman Walgren's bill reflects the continuing support in
Congress for a foreign investment law that protects the economic as
well as military defense interests of the U.S. Although "essential tech-
nologies" is less broad than "essential commerce," the language orig-
inally proposed in the House version of the Exon-Florio Amendment, 05
it clearly would broaden the scope of the Amendment as currently
interpreted by the Bush Administration.3° The Bush Administration
has opposed the Walgren bill on several grounds.1 7 The Adminis-
tration claims the law is not needed since existing laws, including the
current version of the Exon-Florio Amendment, adequately protect
national security. 08 Moreover, the Walgren bill contravenes the U.S.
open door policy toward foreign investments, may violate certain in-
ternational obligations of the U.S., and could produce "a chilling
effect" on needed foreign investment.3°9
Although the Walgren bill's expanded definition of national se-
curity including the protection of "essential technologies" is unlikely
301. House Panel Approves Two Measures on Foreign Investment, Data Gathering, 22 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1352 (Sept. 21, 1990).
302. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 8.
303. H.R. 5225, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
304. Id.
305. See supra notes 244-245 and accompanying text.
306. Charles Dallara, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, testified
at a congressional hearing that, based on the legislative history of the Amendment, "national
security is to be broadly defined ... without limitation to particular industries," but should not
cover commercial and economic considerations. Differing Views on Exon-Florio Are Presented
at Congressional Hearing, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1458 (Mar. 22, 1990).
307. House Subcommittee Debates Virtues of Exon-Florio Provision, 59 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1477, at 186 (Aug. 2, 1990).
308. Id.
309. Id.
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to attract supporters in the foreign investment community, the bill
attempts to alleviate the uncertainty inherent in the current version
of the Exon-Florio Amendment by requiring CFIUS members to de-
velop a list of protected, "essential technologies." Such a list would
provide foreign investors with the guidance that is sorely needed under
the current Amendment. Currently, the broad discretion given the
President by both the Amendment and the proposed regulations leaves
potential for the adoption of radically different policies with respect
to foreign acquisitions without any official notice to foreign investors.
This risk to foreign investors can be minimized by the adoption of
a more definitive'national security standard that is publicized in the
foreign investment community. Without the adoption of a standard
to provide more definitive guidelines for investors, the case-by-case
review of proposed foreign investments will remain highly susceptible
to political influences that could result ultimately in corrupt and ar-
bitrary decisionmaking. 310
Adoption of a more definitive national security standard also will
maximize the foreign policy and national security benefits that can
be realized from the Exon-Florio Amendment's regulatory frame-
work. By adopting such a standard, the CFIUS can play an integral
role in the development and implementation of a coordinated and
consistent U.S. policy toward inward foreign investment. The entry
restriction statutes and other foreign investment regulations reviewed
in the last section are generally inconsistent with respect to the def-
inition of foreign control, the definition of foreign persons, and im-
plementation provisions. Given the large jurisdictional scope accorded
the .CFIUS and the President under the Exon-Florio Amendment and
its proposed regulations, the policies adopted to define and implement
a workable national security standard can provide a model for co-
ordinating the provisions of other statutes that regulate foreign in-
vestment.
IV. Constitutional Issues
The provisions of the Exon-Florio Amendment raise several con-
stitutional issues. These include the validity of presidential power,
310. The political nature of current decisionmaking under the Exon-Florio Amendment has
been recognized as a problem by Elliot Richardson, Chairman of the Association for International
Investment. On June 21, 1990, Richardson asked the Bush Administration to "look into" the
political pressure exerted by members of Congress on the CFIUS staff. He cited a letter to the
President signed by 119 members of Congress urging a CFIUS investigation of the United
Kingdom's BTR PLC's takeover of Norten Company, a Massachusetts corporation. Foreign
Investment: Administration Urged To-Look into "'Politicization" of Exon-Florio, 120 Daily Rep.
for Exec. (BNA) No. A-5, at 1990 (June 21, 1990).
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justiciability, and due process rights under the fifth amendment. This
Part addresses these issues against the broad backdrop of foreign in-
vestment regulation and the policies behind it.
A. Presidential Power
The United States Constitution grants power over the conduct
of foreign affairs to both the executive and legislative branches of
government. Specific constitutional sources of this authority include:
the commerce clause, 311 which gives Congress authority over com-
merce with foreign nations; the treaty power, 312 which is shared by
both Congress and the Executive; and the designation of the President
as Commander-in-Chief. 31 3
The Supreme Court has ruled that Congress may delegate large
grants of its power over foreign commerce to the President. 3 4 Thus,
the Exon-Florio Amendment delegates to the President statutory au-
thority under the commerce clause to block foreign acquisitions s.31  In
addition to statutory authority, however, the Court has found the
President's own constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief and head
of state to support presidential actions affecting foreign investment. 31 6
In his famous opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 1 7
Justice Jackson described presidential powers as fluctuating, "de-
pending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Con-
gress." 318 When the President acts "pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress," his authority is at its maximum.31 9
311. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
312. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
313. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
314. United States v. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 379 (1940); Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 305 (1932).
315. The essence of the authority delegated to the President under the Amendment is the
regulation of business transactions affecting interstate commerce. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c)
(1988); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 576, supra note 9, at 1958.
316. See Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948).
317. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In this case, the majority invalidated an executive order that
directed the Secretary of Commerce to take over operations of steel mills that were the target
of a nationwide strike. Id. at 583. There was no underlying statute, however, authorizing the
President's action. The Court ruled that the executive authority of the President as Commander-
in-Chief was not sufficient to sustain the order despite the key role of steel production in national
defense policies. Id. at 587.
318. Id. at 635.
319. Id. Justice Jackson also describes a zone of twilight in which the President and Congress
have concurrent power. Actions fall into this zone when the President acts solely on his own
independent authority without any congressional action. Presidential authority is at its lowest
when the President takes actions that are incompatible with the express or implied will of
Congress. Id. at 635-38.
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In reviewing constitutional challenges to the Exon-Florio Amend-
ment, by which congressional authorization of presidential authority
is at its maximum, the Court is likely to apply rules that differ from
those applicable to a statute regulating purely domestic matters. 320 For
example, although the Exon-Florio Amendment lacks the clear policy
and guidelines required by the courts for other economic regulatory
laws, it may be exempted from these requirements because it regulates
foreign investment. The rules applied by the Court are likely to give
more deference to presidential actions because of the independent,
constitutional sources for presidential authority over foreign affairs.
In addition to these constitutional sources, authority over foreign
affairs has been asserted independently by the executive through the
use of executive agreements. 321 In his book Democratic Dictator-
ship,32 Arthur Miller theorizes that the basis of authority for these
executive actions is the essential sovereignty of an independent nation,
which justifies actions that protect the security and existence of the
nation.32 Based on his analysis of U.S. foreign affairs, Miller argues
that the U.S. government more often follows the principles of Ma-
chiavelli than the constitutional principles of limited governmental
powers. 32 A similar thesis was advanced by Justice Sutherland in
320. In the context of domestic affairs, Congress is permitted to delegate nonessential
legislative functions to the Executive if the law granting the legislative power contains the policy
objectives of Congress and clear standards for guiding implementation of the law. Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423 (1944). The Court frequently will presume that laws regulating
economic life are constitutional. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). It
is not clearly discernible how the language and substance of a law can satisfy these two criteria.
Court decisions have split on the validity of laws that appear similar in respect to these criteria,
suggesting that the underlying decision criteria may be based on policy. Compare A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating National Recovery Act on
grounds that standards set by Congress were inadequate in limiting administration's discretion)
with Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding the Emergency Price Control Act,
which authorized a presidential appointee to issue regulations to stabilize rents and prices).
321. An executive agreement is "[a] treaty-like agreement with another country in which the
President may bind the country without submission to the Senate (as in the case of a treaty)."
BLAcK's LAW DIcrONAtRY 511 (5th ed. 1979). The Supreme Court has recognized the authority
of the President to enter into such agreements. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981) (upholding validity of executive agreement that called for release of American hostages in
Iran); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (upholding the validity of an executive agreement
that resolved claims against the Soviet Union brought by American nationals).
322. A. Mmum, DamocRAnc DICTAToRsHP (1981).
323. Id. at 76-77.
324. By referring to the theories of Machiavelli, Miller describes the paradox of state power.
Although the "nation-state exists to protect, defend, and further the interests of its members
... [the nation-state] must be preserved even at the expense of the interests of any one citizen
or any small group of citizens." Id. at 50-51. Miler argues that the term "national security" is
used to describe this basic self-preservation interest of the state. He describes historical exercises
of presidential power justified on national security grounds that include the Japanese Internment
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United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,325 in which he stated
that "the investment of the federal government with the powers of
external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of
the Constitution. ' 326 Rather, these powers exist in addition to the
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In Curtiss-Wright, the Court
upheld a law giving the President discretionary power to prohibit the
private sales of arms by U.S. companies to parties involved in a war
in South America. The law lacked the reasonable standards required
by the Court for laws regulating domestic matters. The Court held
that in matters involving foreign affairs, however, reasonable stan-
dards were not required.3 27 The Court abandoned the two-criteria test
applied to economic regulations 32 on the ground that the source of
the President's power to regulate foreign affairs was not based on the
Constitution. 329
B. Justiciability
Given that actions authorized under the Exon-Florio Amendment
are based both on congressional and executive constitutional au-
thorities and on the extra-constitutional authority described in Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corp., challenges based on separation of powers
or invalid delegation of legislative authority are likely to fail. The
extent to which the Court will review challenges to the Amendment,
however, is less clear.
(1) Rules and Decisions of Justiciability
Paragraph (d) of the Exon-Florio Amendment expressly states
that the findings supporting the President's decision to block a pro-
posed acquisition are not reviewable. 30 If the Court accepts the literal
during World War II, the Vietnam War, and covert police actions in foreign nations. Id. at 135-
41. He theorizes that the authority for these actions is not constitutionally based (not granted
by article II) but rather is based on an expanding definition of the state that is undermining the
historical goal of limited constitutional government. Id. at 231.
325. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
326. Id. at 318. Note that the basic theory expounded by Sutherland, that certain powers
relating to foreign affairs were vested in the Continental Congress prior to the Constitution and
are thus extra-constitutional powers, has been challenged by scholars researching this theory's
historical accuracy. See, e.g., Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice
Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946).
327. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316.
328. See supra note 320.
329. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315-18.
330. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(d) (West 1990) ("Findings of the President" are not subject
to judicial review).
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directive of this provision as indicative of a specific legislative intent
to preclude judicial review of decisions under the Amendment, review
will be limited largely to procedural matters. 331 The Court has required
substantial evidence of legislative intent before the strong presump-
tion in favor of judicial review is overcome. 332 The factors weighed
include the legislative history, the absence of a standard that purports
to limit agency discretion, and the structure of the statutory scheme. 333
Under this evidentiary test, actions pursuant to statutes that give broad
discretion to administrative agencies, such as the Environmental Pro-
tection Act, have been held subject to some review, albeit limited.3 34
In overcoming the strong presumption of judicial review, there
must be "clear and convincing evidence" that Congress intended to
preclude judicial review.335 If a court substantially doubts congres-
sional intent exists, it should review the agency actions. 336 Even when
a court finds clear congressional intent to preclude judicial review,
however, it still may review an otherwise discretionary action if a stan-
dard specified in the statute limits action. For example, in Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe,337 the Supreme Court held
that because section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act
of 1966338 provided standards that could be applied to a decision for
locating a highway, the challenged decision to build a highway was
not immune from judicial review. 339 Nonetheless, when the statutory
331. See, e.g., Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 673 (1986)
(holding that the presumption favoring judicial review may be overcome by specific language or
legislative history that reliably indicates legislative intent).
332. Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
333. Id. at 1514-15.
334. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S, 246 (1976) (holding that the operator of
an electric utility cannot challenge a state implementation plan with claims of economic and
technological infeasibility); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir.
1978) (upholding the EPA's use of a particular diffusion model in evaluating air quality was not
arbitrary and capricious).
335. See Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768 (1985); Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 410 (1971). The strong presumption of judicial review given congressional statutes has
been justified by Professor Sunstein as serving
important goals in promoting fidelity to statutory requirements and, where those
requirements are ambiguous or vague, in increasing the likelihood that the regulatory
process will be a reasonable exercise of discretion instead of a bow in the direction of
powerful private groups.
Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 653, 655
(1985).
336. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984).
337. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
338. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(0 (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-449, 96 Stat. 2444 (1983).
339. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. Section 4(f) of the Department of
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standard does not give the court a "meaningful standard against which
to judge the agency's exercise of discretion," actions are committed
to the agency's discretion.3 40 Such subjective standards support the
decision to completely defer to the agency's discretion.14 1
Even assuming that the Exon-Florio Amendment's provision lim-
iting judicial review is given no effect, the President's findings may
be considered a discretionary, policy-making function and thus un-
reviewable. In Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
Steamship Corp.,3 42 the Supreme Court refused to review a Civil Aer-
onautics Board (CAB) order that denied a foreign company's request
for air routes between the U.S. and overseas destinations. Because
the order required the approval of the President under section 801
of the Civil Aeronautics Act,3 43 the Court majority held that the final
order embodied "presidential discretion as to political matters beyond
the competence of the courts to adjudicate." 344 The four dissenters
agreed with the majority that the President's decisionmaking process
was "an exercise of his discretion in foreign affairs or military matters
...[and not] subject to judicial review." 3 4 They dissented, however,
on grounds that the CAB's recommendation was subject to judicial
review in order to preserve the integrity of the administrative proc-
ess.3 46 If the Court follows its decision in Chicago & Southern Air
Lines, Inc., it probably will not review the Presidential findings jus-
tifying a decision to block an acquisition under the Amendment.
Under statutes involving national security issues, courts have ac-
corded the executive substantial discretion in determining when the
national security is threatened. For example, in a challenge to a de-
cision by the Secretary of Commerce denying an export license under
the Export Administration Act,3 47 a federal district court held that an
Transportation Act of 1966 prohibited the use of park land, bird sanctuaries, and recreational
areas unless the Secretary determined that: "(1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to
the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to
such park ...[or] recreational area." 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-
449, 96 Stat. 2444 (1983).
340. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
341. Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
342. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
343. 49 U.S.C. § 601, repealed by Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, §
1401, 72 Stat. 731, 806 (1959).
344. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc., 333 U.S. at 114. The Court also refused to review
the CAB's recommendation to the President because such a decision would be an advisory
opinion only. In addition, the Board's recommendation was not considered ripe for judicial
review since it was not final. Id. at 112.
345. Id. at 115.
346. Id. at 117.
347. Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp.
III 1985)).
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exporter of laser mirrors could not challenge the Secretary's decision
that the export threatened national security.34 In addition to rec-
ognizing the discretionary nature of the Secretary's actions, the court
described them as policy decisions not involving an element of the
offense of exporting goods without a license and, therefore, not re-
viewable.34 9
Courts do not always find, however, that statutes designed to
protect national security interests are immune to all levels of judicial
review on the merits. In Doe v. Casey, 350 an appellate court held that
section 102(c) of the, National Security Act 351 did not preclude judicial
review of an employee's termination because there was no showing
of sufficient congressional intent to preclude review, and the section
contained "law to apply." The standard gleaned by the court from
the language of section 102(c) was that the termination must have
some relationship to the interests of the U.S. and cannot be "a result
of the mere whim of the Director. ' 35 2
In applying the above rules and decisions to the Exon-Florio
Amendment, an argument supporting judicial review can be made.
Although the legislative history of the Amendment reflects an intent
to give broad discretion to the President, 353 the provision in paragraph
(f) of the Amendment, requiring the President to provide Congress
with a detailed report on any actions taken to block a foreign ac-
quisition, indicates that Congress did not intend this broad discretion
to be unchecked. 314 Congress has used this type of reporting require-
348. Spawr Optical Research, Inc. v. Baldrige, 649 F. Supp. 1366 (D.D.C. 1986). The court
held that in bringing anaction against the exporter under the Act, the Commerce Department
did not need to show that the export of laser mirrors would threaten the national security.
Moreover, the procedure for developing the regulatory criteria used by the Commerce Department
to identify "control list" goods was the proper forum for the exporter's national security claims.
Id. at 1371.
349. Id. at 1372. This policy decision was described further in Haire v. United States, 869
F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1989), as a foreign policy matter that is "not part of the normal business
of courts." Id. at 535. The court in this decision upheld the plaintiff's right to an action for
attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-559 (1988), finding that
evidence reviewed by the administrative law judge also could be reviewed in camera by the
district court. Haire, 869 F.2d at 535.
350. 796 F.2d 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (involving an unlawful discharge action by a homosexual
employee).
351. 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1988) (providing that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any CIA employee "whenever he
shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States").
352. Doe, 796 F.2d at 1518.
353. See supra note 235.
354. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(f) (West 1990) (requiring that the President "immediately
transmit to the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Represeniatives a written
report of the action which the President intends to take, including a detailed explanation of the
findings made").
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ment as a substitute for the legislative veto, which was found un-
constitutional in 1983 in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha.315 Given the confidential and classified nature of the infor-
mation that would justify an action under the Amendment, this re-
porting requirement reflects substantial congressional concern over
the use of the President's discretion under paragraph (d) of the
Amendment.
C. Due Process
The procedural due process rights guaranteed by the fifth amend-
ment countervails the argument that Presidential findings are not jus-
ticiable. 3 6 Action by the President to block a proposed acquisition
or divest a completed acquisition may result in a substantial monetary
loss to investors. 3 7 Under Goldberg v. Kelly,31 8 the due process rights
recognized in an administrative decisionmaking process depend on a
test that balances the interest of a party against the government's in-
terest in summary adjudication. 35 9
In the case of a divestiture order, a good argument can be made
that the parties will suffer a "grievous loss" as a result of the Pres-
ident's decision. The government's interest in summary adjudication
in the case of CFIUS proceedings is likely to differ from the gov-
ernment's interest in Goldberg, in which providing hearings for a large
number of welfare recipients would have been administratively bur-
densome. 360 Since enactment of the Exon-Florio Amendment, only a
few acquisitions have been subject to a full investigation by CFIUS.16 ,
The government's interest in limiting the due process rights of parties
subject to a CFIUS review most likely is based on national security
grounds and the need for secrecy.3 62
355. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The legislative veto was a statutory provision that allowed Congress
to override agency or executive action. Id. at 967-73 (White, J., dissenting).
356. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
357. There is a stronger due process claim when a divestiture is ordered because the foreign
investor must sell the prohibited investment in a short time, which may require taking a significant
loss. In the case of a blocked acquisition, the real losers are the stockholders of the acquired
company. In any event, substantial legal and transactional costs may have been expended by the
parties in the process of negotiating and consummating the acquisition.
358. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
359. Id. at 264, 266-71 (holding that welfare recipients' due process rights were satisfied by
the state's pretermination evidentiary hearing).
360. Id. at 267.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 289-291.
362. Currently, the parties' participation in the CFIUS investigation process is limited to
providing requested information and informal negotiations with the CFIUS staff. See Dennin,
supra note 16, at 377.
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The outcome of the Goldberg test will depend on the sensitivity
of the information reviewed by the CFIUS under the Exon-Florio
Amendment. Courts have recognized limited due process rights under
statutes protecting national security interests. In the past, courts fre-
quently have overturned dismissals of government employees3 63 and
revocations of security clearances. 364 Recently, in reviewing the dis-
charge of a homosexual employee who worked at the Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA),365 the federal district court held that due process
is satisfied as long as the employee is given an opportunity to be heard
in a meaningful manner .366 The court found that given the sensitive
nature of the CIA, the procedure permitting the employee to examine
the polygraph officer's report and submit lengthy written arguments
on his behalf met the constitutional requirements of due process. 367
Currently, the CFIUS has provided procedures that give parties
to an acquisition the ability to be heard.368 If the national security
interests protected by the Exon-Florio Amendment are considered to
be as sensitive as the security interests of the CIA, CFIUS procedures
are likely to meet the due process requirements of the fifth amend-
ment. It is likely, however, that the national security risk posed by
a foreign-controlled business that produces defense goods or tech-
nology is more remote or less sensitive than the risks posed by a dis-
loyal CIA employee.3 69 This lessened sensitivity coupled with the
substantial property interest that may be lost as the result of a di-
363. See, e.g., Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) (holding that employee dismissal
without a hearing violated agency's procedural regulations); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956)
(holding that executive was not authorized by Congress to dismiss FDA employee whose work
was not closely related to national security); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) (holding that
dismissal of government employee on grounds he was a security risk was not authorized by the
statute).
364. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (holding that debarment
of contractor from participating in certain government contracts violated the provisions of the
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1)(B)).
365. Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
366. Id. at 1524 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
367. Id.
368. These measures include providing data on the acquisition to the CFIUS and informal
meetings with the CFIUS. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 238, § 501. As a result of these
interactions, certain acquisitions have been approved subject to negotiated conditions. See
Auerback, Panel Weighs Sale of U.S. Chip Firm: Security Issues Aired, Wash. Post, Jan. 18,
1989, at F3.
369. The risks implied in the proposed regulations include the transfer of business assets, the
dissolution or relocation of the business, and the termination or non-fulfillment of contracts. See
Proposed Regulations, supra note 238, § 213. These risks differ from the risk that a CIA
employee may pass classified information to a foreign nation in that they can be alleviated by
the President in a national emergency, see supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing the
IEEPA and Trading With the Enemy Act), and involve actions subject to public scrutiny.
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vestment order may justify more formal procedural protections for
the parties to an acquisition. The limited timetable under which the
CFIUS must conduct reviews of acquisitions may have been motivated
by congressional concern over procedural protections for the parties.
D. Takings Challenge
Foreign investors who suffer financial loss as a result of a di-
vestiture order issued by the President pursuant to the Exon-Florio
Amendment may be able to claim compensation under the fifth
amendment's taking clause, which provides that "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. ' 7 0 The
protections of this clause have been extended to "alien friends" whose
property is taken by the U.S. government. 37
The purpose of the takings clause is to preclude the government
from "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens that, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. ' 372
In determining if an action by the government constitutes an unlawful
taking, courts focus on the extent of the interference with a private
party's property rights and the character of the government's ac-
tion 73
A government divestment order issued under the Exon-Florio
Amendment is likely to be viewed as a taking if property loss can be
proved. An order resulting in property loss totally interferes with the
private investor's rights to own a particular business enterprise. In
addition, the nature of the divestment order singles out a particular
foreign investor, unlike a regulation that affects a class of persons
in a similar position.3 74
An Exon-Florio divestment order can be challenged under the
fifth amendment's public use clause and the just compensation clause.
A challenge under the public use clause is very likely to fail as the
government's action need only be rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose in order to be found constitutional. 375 Under the Exon-
Florio Amendment, divestment orders are issued for the purpose of
protecting the national security, a substantial public purpose. A chal-
370. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
371. Russian Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1931).
372. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
373. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
374. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), the Court ruled that a
taking does not take place if the prohibition applies over a broad cross section of land and
thereby "secure[s] an average reciprocity of advantage .... "
375. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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lenge under the just compensation clause is more likely to succeed as
long as the foreign investor can prove injury. The Exon-Florio
Amendment and the regulations are silent on the issue of compen-
sation to the foreign owner who must divest a completed acquisition.
Proof of financial loss resulting from the forced sale of the foreign
investor's property interest, however, may be the most difficult aspect
of a takings challenge. 376
E. Equal Protection Challenge
United States-incorporated businesses that are defined by the re-
gulations as foreign-controlled may raise an equal protection chal-
lenge to the Exon-Florio Amendment. 377 Such corporations are subject
to the restrictions on ownership embodied in the Exon-Florio Amend-
ment because of the alienage of their owners. Regulations that result
in disparate treatment based on alienage have been subject to strict
scrutiny analysis under equal protection jurisprudence. 378 If a foreign-
controlled domestic corporation is considered to have equal protec-
tion rights comparable to those of resident aliens, clearly the strict
scrutiny analysis will apply. A court is more likely, however, to decide
that the rights of a foreign-controlled domestic corporation are not
comparable to those of resident aliens on grounds that they do not
constitute a "discrete and insular" minority. 379 Moreover, the past
open door policy toward foreign investment in the U.S. does not con-
stitute a history of discrimination against foreign-controlled domestic
corporations that would justify strict scrutiny analysis.
376. It is quite conceivable that a loss may be incurred. The President's order in the Mamco
divestiture case gave CATIC, the foreign investor, three months to divest its interests in Mamco.
See supra note 292. Compliance with such a short time limit may result in a low market price
for the divested assets, subjecting the foreign owner to a financial loss. Since factors other than
the divestiture order will affect the market price of business assets, however, the extent of the
loss attributable to the divestment order may be difficult to prove. Conceivably, the foreign
investor may profit from the forced sale but at a lower rate of return than would be obtained
in the absence of the divestment order.
377. Such corporations are accorded due process rights under the fifth amendment. Equal
protection jurisprudence is applied to the federal government through the fifth amendment.
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that public school segregation in the District of
Columbia was a violation of the fifth amendment's due process clause).
378. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that state laws denying welfare
benefits to aliens violate equal protection).
379. Id. at 371-72. Strict scrutiny protection is given to minorities considered suspect in that
they are "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 21 (1973) (upholding Texas financing plan for public education).
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Thus, an equal protection challenge to the Exon-Florio Amend-
ment is likely to be judged using a rational basis analysis. Under this
analysis, a regulation that discriminates between different classes must
have some rational relationship to a legitimate governmental pur-
pose.380 In the case of the Exon-Florio Amendment, supporters of the
Amendment believe such a rational relationship exists between the
protection of U.S. national security and the need to protect certain
sectors of the economy from foreign control. Proponents of an open
door policy, however, may disagree with this proposition. Because of
the great deference given the legislature under a rational basis test,
the proposed regulations' discriminatory impact on foreign-controlled
domestic corporations is likely to be found constitutional.
V. International Law Issues
United States treaty obligations with respect to foreign invest-
ment are contained generally in Friendship, Commerce, and Navi-
gation (FCN) treaties,"' Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), 82 and
multilateral agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).3 3 Although these treaties contain provisions ex-
380. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (upholding a ban on new pushcart food
vendors in the French Quarter using a rational basis analysis).
381. There are 21 modern U.S. FCN treaties. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty
Program of the United States, 21 CoRNoI Ir'L L.J. 201, 207 (1988). These include, but are
not limited to: Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, May 29, 1966, United States-Thailand,
19 U.S.T. 5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6450; Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, United States-
Togo, Feb. 8, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 6193; Convention of Establishment, Nov. 25,
1959, United States-France, 11 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, Mar. 27, 1956, United States-Netherlands, 8 U.S.T. 2045; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-West Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S.
No. 3595; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
4. U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. For a complete list of modem FCN treaties see Vandevelde,
supra, at 207-08 n.60.
382. These treaties, which generally are executed with developing nations, include, but are
not limited to: Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments with Agreed
Minutes, Oct. 27, 1982, United States-Panama, S. TREArT Doc. No. 14, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986); Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Dec. 6,
1983, United States-Senegal, S. TREATY Doc. No. 15, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Treaty
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Dec. 13, 1983, United
States-Haiti, S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Treaty Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Aug. 3, 1984, United States-Zaire, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, July 22, 1985, United States-Morocco, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 18, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). For other treaties, see Gudgeon, United States Bilateral
Investment Treaties: Comments on Their Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment Standards, 4
INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 105, 106-07 (1986).
383. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A5, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
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empting actions by a nation-state justified on natiohal security grounds,
it is foreseeable that a more vigorous use of the Exon-Florio Amend-
ment to block foreign acquisitions may exceed the bounds of the trea-
ties' provisions.
A. International Treaties and Agreements
(1) Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties
The purpose of modern FCN treaties3  is to regulate private com-
merce between U.S. citizens and the citizens of foreign nations. 85
Under FCN treaty provisions, host nations guarantee foreign na-
tionals commercial access to their markets, property protections, and
standards of treatment.31 6 An example of an FCN provision granting
commercial access is found in article VII of the U.S.-Japanese FCN
treaty.38 7 This provision grants the nationals of the signatories the
right to national treatment when
engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other
business activities within the territories of the other [signatory] ....
Accordingly, such nationals and companies shall be permitted within
such territories: (a) to establish and maintain branches, agencies... ;
(b) to organize companies under the general company laws of such
other [signatory]; and, (c) to control and manage enterprises which
they have established or acquired.388
The general right of commercial access or entry, however, is not
absolute in FCN treaties. For example, article VII, paragraph two,
of the U.S.-Japanese FCN treaty precludes entry of a foreign national
into certain sectors of the economy, including "public utilities -en-
terprises or enterprises engaged in shipbuilding, air or water trans-
port, banking involving depository or fiduciary functions, or the
exploitation of land or other natural resources. ' 39 The sectors listed
in this paragraph of FCN treaties are based largely on existing U.S.
domestic laws restricting foreign investment. These restrictions usu-
384. This discussion focuses on FCN treaties ratified after World War II.
385. Walker, Modem Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MN.- L. REv.
805, 806 (1958).
386. Gudgeon, supra note 382, at 108; see also Berger & McConnell, Limitations Imposed
by the Constitution and Treaties of the United States on the Regulation of Foreign Investment,
in MANuAL oF FoRmoN INvEsmEN i n UN=TD STATaS, supra note 93, at 13.
387. Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
art. VII, para. 1, 4 U.S.T. 2069, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter U.S.-Japanese Treaty].
388. Id. These rights were subject to "special formalities in connection with the establishment
of alien-controlled enterprises"; but such formalities could not impair the substance of the rights
and must give favored nation treatment to the signatory's nationals. Id. art. VII, para. 2.
389. Id.
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ally are subject to a grandfather clause exempting enterprises existing
at the time the treaty is ratified.39°
The FCN provisions protecting foreign property guarantee that
the "nationals and companies of either Party shall receive the most
constant protection and security within the territories of the other
party."3 91 An additional property provision forbids the expropriation
of property held by foreign nationals unless such a taking is "for a
public purpose" and "prompt payment of just compensation" is
forthcoming. 392 Foreign nationals are accorded national and most fa-
vored nation treatment with respect to the general prohibition of ex-
propriations and takings for a public purpose.3 93 This provision
seemingly permits the U.S. to insist on the same treatment for U.S.
nationals' property as is given for other foreign and domestic en-
terprises in the host nation.
Finally, FCN treaties exempt from all the treaty provisions na-
tional laws that
[Regulate] the production of or traffic in arms, ammunition and
implements of war, or traffic in other materials carried on directly
or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment
[and are] necessary to fulfill the obligations of a [signatory] for the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or
necessary to protect its essential security interests .... 394
A key issue in the interpretation of this exemption provision is whether
"essential security interests" is within the discretion of each signatory
party, not unlike the provisions of the Exon-Florio Amendment, or
subject to judicial review by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 395
In a 1986 opinion on the U.S. paramilitary activities in Nicaragua,
the World Court concluded that the "essential security interests" of
a signatory party to an FCN treaty may be reviewed by the ICJ in
390. The intent of this grandfather clause is to assure that the vested rights of foreign
investors are protected. See Alvarez, supra note 14, at 23; see also U.S.-Japanese Treaty, supra
note 387, art. VII, para. 3.
391. U.S.-Japanese Treaty, supra note 387, art. VI, para. 1. During treaty negotiations, this
provision was considered by the U.S. as nonnegotiable. Alvarez, supra note 14, at 25.
392. U.S.-Japanese Treaty, supra note 387, art. VI, para. 3.
393. The rights extended to each signatory of an FCN treaty are qualified by a standard of
national treatment or most favored nation treatment. National treatment assures that the signatory
nation granting the right will treat the other signatory's nationals as it treats its own nationals.
Most favored nation treatment is a lesser guarantee because it requires only that the nation
granting the right will treat the other signatory's nationals no less favorably than the nationals
of another foreign nation. Berger & McConnell, supra note 386, at 15-16.
394. U.S.-Japanese Treaty, supra note 387, art. XXI, para. 1 (c)-(d).
395. Under article XXIV, paragraph 2, in the event diplomacy fails, disputes between the
parties involving interpretation of the treaty provisions are resolved by the ICJ. Id. art. XXIV,
para. 2.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
determining if its action falls within the exemption provision. 396
The resolution of a dispute between a foreign investor and host
nation, however, is limited generally by a FCN treaty because the
treaties do not provide for binding arbitration.39 Resolution of a dis-
pute by the ICJ is available, but it requires the investor's home nation
to bring the action.39
(2) Bilateral Investment Treaties
The major purpose of the U.S. in negotiating Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties (BITs) is to protect U.S. investments in developing
nations.39 Developing nations that ratify these treaties are interested
primarily in attracting new U.S. investments. Unlike FCN treaties,
which contain agreements on navigation and trade, BITs deal exclu-
sively with investment matters including access or entry, general treat-
ment standards, property protections, and financial transfers.'4
Article II of BITs, entitled Treatment of Investment, gives na-
tional or most favored nation (MFN) treatment to all investments of
the signatorys' nationals and companies. 4°' The Article provides that
existing and new foreign investments be treated by the host nation
no less favorably than the investments from other foreign nations and
the host nation's own nationals. In addition to these treatment pro-
visions, BITs provide further protections for entry by precluding the
host nation from imposing investment performance requirements on
new foreign investors.4°3
Like the FCN treaties, BITs contain exceptions to the general
protections granted by their provisions.4 These exceptions primarily
involve sectors of the host nation's economy that are considered sen-
sitive. 405 Sensitive sectors are listed in the annex of the treaty in order
396. 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27) (Military and Paramilitary Activities
In and Against Nicaragua); see also Alvarez, supra note 14, at 28-30.
397. See Vandevelde, supra note 381, at 256.
398. Id. at 257.
399. Gudgeon, supra note 382, at 110.
400. Id. at 109; see also Vandevelde, supra note 381, at 202.
401. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Mar. 12, 1986, United States-Bangladesh, S. TREATY Doc. No. 23, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. (1986).
This provision was cdnsidered a key policy objective of the U.S. when negotiating these treaties.
See International Investment Policy, 19 WEEKLY Comr. PRS. Doc. 1214 (Sept. 9, 1983).
402. See Vandevelde, supra note 381, at 220 n.125.
403. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Sept. 29, 1982, United States-Egypt, art. II, para. 7, S. TREATY Doc. No. 24, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986).
404. See Gudgeon, supra note 382, at 119.
405. Id. In addition, activities of overriding national interest may be excepted from the
treaty's national and MFN treatment provisions. Id.
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to put foreign investors on notice of investments subject to higher
risks. 4  Generally, the policy of BITs is to discourage the exemption
of sectors from the national and MFN treatment provisions. Thus,
if a sector is added to the annex after the treaty is ratified, existing
foreign investments in that sector retain their right to national and
MFN treatment. 4 7 Also, the addition of a new exception is subject
to formal negotiations between the parties to the treaty.408
BITs provide substantial protection for the foreign investor's
property. Article II protects the foreign investor's property by pro-
viding that:
[i]nvestment . . . shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable
treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory
of the other Party. The treatment, protection and security of in-
vestment shall be in accordance with applicable national laws, and
shall in no case be less than that required by international law. Nei-
ther Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary and discriminatory
measures the management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment,
acquisition, expansion or disposal of investment . . . made by the
other Party.409
This provision precludes the host nation from passing laws that uni-
laterally change the provisions of an investment contract. Both na-
tional and international legal protections are afforded such property
interests. In addition, in the event of a war or civil disturbance that
results in the loss of property held by foreign investors, BIT pro-
visions require that the claims of foreign investors be given national
or MFN treatment, whichever is better. 410
Finally, BITs also contain a national security exemption that pro-
vides:
[t]his Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of
any and all measures necessary for the maintenance of public order
and morals, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or
the protection of its own security interest.411
406. Foreign investments are not barred necessarily from the sectors in the annex but may
be subject to regulation proscribed by national and MFN treatment provisions. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Dec. 6, 1983, United States-Senegal, S. TanrTY Doc. No. 15, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
410. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Sept. 29, 1982, United States-Egypt, art II, para. 7, S. TREATY Doc. No. 24, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986).
411. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Dec.




Like the "essential security interests" provision of the FCN trea-
ties, it is not clear whether determination of the host's security interest
is wholly discretionary or subject to judicial review. 412 Unlike FCN
treaties, however, an important feature of BITs is a binding arbi-
tration procedure for resolving investment disputes. 413 Certain dis-
putes between a foreign investor and host nation414 are resolved by
negotiation of the parties or by any previously agreed-upon dispute
settlement procedure that may include binding arbitration. 415
(3) Multilateral Agreements
Multilateral agreements that affect foreign investments include the
Organization of Economic and Commercial Development Convention
(OECD)416 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 417
The U.S. is a member of both multilateral agreements.
One objective of the OECD Convention is to maintain and extend
the liberalization of capital movements. 41 Pursuant to this objective,
a Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements 4 9 provides that mem-
ber nations shall not maintain or enact regulations or practices that
regulate
the granting of licenses, concessions, or similar authorizations, in-
cluding conditions or requirements attaching to such authorizations
.* . that raise special barriers or limitations with respect to non-res-
ident investors, and that have the intent or the effect of preventing
or significantly impeding inward direct investment by non-resi-
dents. 42o
This provision supporting the elimination of investment barriers, how-
ever, is subject to a list of sector-related exceptions that members may
add under section 2(b) of the Capital Movements Code.4 21
Finally, although primarily concerned with trade regulation, GATT
members recently discussed the adoption of a policy to eliminate or
reduce trade-related investment measures. 42 These are generally de-
412. See Alvarez, supra note 14, at 37.
413. See Vandevelde, supra note 381, at 260 n.395.
414. See id.
415. Id. at 262.
416. Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Dec. 14,
1960, 12 U.S.T. 1729, T.I.A.S. No. 4891 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
417. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. AS, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
418. OECD Convention, supra note 416, art. 2, para. d.
419. OECD, Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements (1986).
420. Id. annex A, list A, § 1(b).
421. Id. art. 2(b); see also Alvarez, supra note 14, at 49.
422. See 86 Dmr. ST. Bora. 46, 48 (1986).
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fined as measures adopted by host nations designed to increase the
foreign investor's procurement of local goods and services as inputs
and to increase exports. 423 The U.S. has led the effort to restrict the
adoption of these measures by GATT members424 because they artif-
ically distort trade and foreign investment by giving preferences to
domestically-produced goods.
Although adherence to the provisions of the OECD Convention
and GATT is based largely on voluntary compliance, 425 the adoption
of laws contrary to these provisions is likely to weaken a member's
negotiating position at these multilateral forums. 426
B. Interpretation of Treaties and Agreements
Due to the sovereign immunity protections of host nations in their
domestic courts, 427 foreign investors alleging a treaty violation as a
result of a divestiture order issued by the President under the Exon-
Florio Amendment will be limited effectively to the dispute settlement
provisions of the treaty.
If sovereign immunity were waived, however, a U.S. court would
attempt to construe the treaty and the Exon-Florio Amendment in a
manner that gives effect to the provisions of both "without violating
the language of either. '428 In the absence of such a construction, the
"last in time rule" generally gives force to the most recently enacted
law.429 Application of this general rule to a conflict between the Exon-
Florio Amendment and, for example, the U.S.-Japanese FCN treaty
of 1953430 would give force to the Amendment.
In construing potential conflicts between treaty provisions and the
Exon-Florio Amendment, a court probably would follow the rule of
Cook v. United States,4 31 which holds that "a treaty will not be deemed
to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such pur-
pose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed. ' 432 This kind
423. Moran & Pearson, Tread Carefully in the Field of Trip Measures, I 1 WORLD ECON.
119 (1988).
424. See Alvarez, supra note 14, at 52-53.
425. See, e.g., OECD Convention, supra note 416, art. 5, para. b.
426. See Alvarez, supra note 14, at 152-53.
427. See Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
428. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
429. See id.
430. U.S.-Japanese Treaty, supra note 387.
431. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
432. Id. at 120; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243,
252 (1983); Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 690 (1979).
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of clear purpose probably will not be found in the Exon-Florio
Amendment. Both the House Conference Report and paragraph (h)
of the Amendment expressly state that existing laws shall not be altered
or affected by the Amendment.43 3 In addition, the Treasury Depart-
ment's comments on the proposed regulations affirm this congres-
sional intent by stating that the CFIUS "intends to implement [the
Amendment] and [its] regulations in a manner fully consistent with
the international obligations of the United States. ' 434
This clear congressional intent and the existence of formal treaty
termination provisions435 are likely to compel a court to rule that the
national security standard in the Exon-Florio Amendment falls within
the national security exemption provisions of FCN treaties and BITs.
Unlike private contracts, the provisions of treaties generally are con-
strued liberally, and a court may "look beyond the written words to
the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construc-
tion adopted by the parties. ' 436 Evidence relied on by a court in con-
struing treaty provisions include the negotiating history, the conduct
of the signatories, drafts of the convention, and legal precedents in
foreign and U.S. courts.437 In construing older treaties such as the
Warsaw Convention, the Supreme Court has found that changes in
the conduct of the signatories may not abrogate the treaty as long as
the underlying purposes of the treaty as construed by the court still
is given effect.438
In applying these rules to the older FCN treaties, actions pursuant
to the Exon-Florio Amendment may be found consistent with the un-
derlying purpose of the "essential security" exception of the treaties
because of changes in the national security needs of the parties. Al-
433. Paragraph (h) states: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter or affect any
existing power, process, regulation, investigation, enforcement measure, or review provided by
any other provision of law." 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(h) (West 1990). The conference report
expressly states that "[t]he Conferees do not intend to abrogate existing obligations of the U.S.
pursuant to treaties, including Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation." H.R. CozN.
REP. No. 576, supra note 9, at 1960.
434. Proposed Treasury Regulations, supra note 238, at 29,746.
435. See, e.g., U.S.-Japanese Treaty, supra note 387, art. XXV. The existence of a formal
procedure for terminating a treaty has been used by the Court as additional grounds for ruling
that a treaty has not been repealed by a later congressional statute. See Trans World Airlines,
466 U.S. at 252-53 (1983) (upholding the continued validity of the Warsaw Convention).
436. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1984) (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v.
United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943)).
437. See id. at 400; see also Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 254-61 (outlining a method
of construing treaties).
438. See Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 251-53 (holding that the adoption of a fixed air
carrier liability limit for cargo that was not tied to the market value of gold, as originally
provided in the Warsaw Convention, was not inconsistent with the Convention's purpose).
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though a party to a treaty may claim that a treaty no longer is binding
as a result of substantial changes in circumstances occurring after the
treaty was ratified, 439 Congress made no such claim with respect to
FCN treaties when enacting the Exon-Florio Amendment. As long as
the parties to a treaty continue to assert its binding effect, a private
party cannot invoke changed circumstances as a reason for not en-
forcing the treaty provisions. 44°
Although these same rules of construction would apply to BITs,
the binding arbitration provisions may result in a different ruling on
any conflict between the treaty's national security exemption and the
Exon-Florio Amendment. Under article II of BITs, the rights of inves-
tors must be determined in accordance with applicable national laws,
treaty provisions, and customary international law. 44 Although U.S.
courts in interpreting BITs are subject to this same provision, due to
the complex interrelationships among these different sources of law,
the difference in forum may result in a different outcome. The pro-
vision in article II requiring that treatment standards be construed,
at a minimum, in accordance with international law reflects the draft-
ers' recognition of potential conflicts in the law.
C. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Finally, the broad definitions of "foreign person" and "U.S. per-
son" in the proposed regulations for the Exon-Florio Amendment raise
legal issues with respect to U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction." 2 These
definitions extend the Amendment's authority to the foreign parent
of foreign-owned, U.S. domestic corporations. As a general rule, courts
narrowly construe statutes conferring subject matter jurisdiction on
domestic agencies in order to avoid any conflict with international law
principles. 43 Regulations that exert extraterritorial jurisdiction poten-
tially pose the danger of retaliation by other nations in the form of
blocking statutes, which prohibit resident corporations from comply-
ing with a foreign nation's service of process and discovery require-
439. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FORIGNO RELATnoNS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 153
& comment c (1965).
440. Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 253 (1983).
441. For the role of customary international law in treaty interpretation, see Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031, 1060, T.S. No. 993.
442. For a discussion of the proposed regulations, see supra notes 258-267 and accompanying
text.
443. See FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Moussan, 636 F.2d 1300, 1323 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
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ments." 4 Courts, however, have found sufficient minimum contacts
between foreign owners and U.S. businesses to justify asserting ju-
risdiction over them. 45 In analyzing these jurisdictional issues, courts
frequently focus on the scope and degree of control the foreign owner
or parent company exerts on the U.S. business. 46
Despite possible conflicts between international treaties and ac-
tions taken pursuant to the Exon-Florio Amendment, foreign investors
are unlikely to seek redress of an adverse Exon-Florio order in in-
ternational forums.447 The results of these conflicts are more likely to
be reciprocal actions by other nations and, thereby, a weakening of
the U.S. foreign policy position supporting elimination of trade and
investment restrictions. 44
These foreign policy costs in combination with possible consti-
tutional challenges and the economic costs resulting from the increase
of foreign investment risk in the U.S. may, become substantial, es-
pecially in the event a new administration adopts a more protectionist
position toward foreign investment. The current undefined national
security standard would allow such a shift in administrative policy.
Only if national security is seriously at risk would there be a reasonable
justification for the potential costs of such an undefined standard. In
the next Part, the current problems facing the U.S. defense industrial
base are reviewed and guidelines that provide foreign investors with
a more definitive landscape of U.S. national security interests are pro-
posed.
444. See, e.g., The Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, ch. 11, Halsburg's Statutes
of England vol. 50(1), at 258. This statute permits U.K. officials to limit the production or
transfer of information and documents from U.K. citizens and agencies to persons or agencies
in a foreign country.
445. See, e.g., United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 3.33 U.S. 795 (1948) (holding that
there was subject matter jurisdiction over the British parent of a U.S. corporation because
officials from the parent visited the U.S. to engage in management functions on behalf of the
parent).
446. See, e.g., id. at 795, 815 (focusing on the parent's "constant suspension and interven-
tion"); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123 (D.N.H. 1975) (holding that
jurisdiction is proper because of the parent's control over the essential business activities of its
subsidiary).
447. Foreign investors probably will not want to antagonize the U.S., especially if they want
access to U.S. markets. See, e.g., Torem & Craig, Control of Foreign Investment in France, 66
McH. L. REv. 669, 716 (1968).
448. U.S. foreign policy objectives at the Uruguay Round of GATT include the elimination
of trade-related investment measures that artificially distort trade and foreign investment by giving
preferences to domestically produced goods, increasing exports by government subsidies, and
reducing exports by qualitative restrictions. See Alvarez, supra note 14, at 116-17. In addition,
a U.S. objective for the OECD includes a strengthened policy of extending national treatment
to foreign enterprises owned by nationals from member nations. Id. at 116. See supra note 51
for a discussion on the Uruguay Round of GAT.
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VI. Toward a Definition of National Security
Recent studies by the Department of Defense indicate and civilian
commentators have warned that the defense industrial base, composed
mainly of high-technology industries," 9 is declining. 410 One result of
this decline is the loss of leading edge technological products; 451 a key
technology in which the U.S. recently has lost its leading position is
the electronics industry.4 2 This decline in the defense industrial base
increasingly has rendered the U.S. defense industry potentially unable
to meet the projected wartime production requirements in the rela-
tively short period of time that would be necessary. 453
Reasons for the decline in the defense industrial base vary, but
include: inadequate government planning; 454 foreign competition in
critical U.S. industries; 455 inadequate controls on foreign invest-
ments;4 6 inadequate protection of critical technologies under the Ex-
port Control Act;457 inadequate government subsidy programs; 458
inefficient U.S. industries; 4 9 and the growing abundance of dual use
goods."6 Many different solutions to the decline in the defense in-
dustrial base have been offerred;46' one solution was the enactment
of the Exon-Florio Amendment.
449. E. GRAHAM & P. KRUGMAN, supra note 25, at 88.
450. See generally Am FORCE ASSOCIATION & USNI DATABASE, supra note 82, at 31-51
(discussing decline in raw material resources used by the military and decline in productivity
indicators in U.S. defense industries).
451. Id. at 1. (citing DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, REPORT OF THE
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON SEMICONDUCTOR DEPENDENCY (1988)).
452. Id.
453. Defense Department Studies and a 1980 inquiry by Congress indicated that U.S. industry
could not expand its production to meet wartime mobilization in less than 18 months. Id.
454. For the past 30 years, the Department of Defense has assumed that any major war will
be short. Recently, the possibility of a protracted conventional war has been given more attention.
See id. at 12; see also L. OLvEY, H. LEONARD & B. ARLNGHAUS, INDUSTRIAL CAPACrrY AND
DEFENSE PLANNING 106, 114 (1983).
455. See Am FORCE ASSOCIATION & USNI DATABASE, supra note 82, at 1-2, 12, 16-21.
456. J. ELLISON, J. FRUN N& T. STANLEY, supra note 78, at 77-78.
457. Id. at 79-80.
458. Budget cuts in federally funded defense research have been blamed for the loss of the
U.S. technological edge. Am FORCE ASSOCIATION & USNI DATABASE, supra note 82, at 21-25.
459. U.S. industry is criticized for falling to invest adequately in its capacity to maintain a
low cost and competitive position in the production of critical goods. In addition, the lack of
consensus for product standards has been blamed for raising production costs. E. GRAHAM & P.
KRuGM N, supra note 25, at 89.
460. Today high technology goods are largely dual use goods (accounting for approximately
95% of worldwide sales), which have commercial as well as military uses. Twenty-five years ago
the leading technologies were dominated by military goods. Id. at 89.
461. See, e.g., Am FORCE ASSOCIATION & USNI DATABASE, supra note 82, at 62-63; J.
ELISON, J. FRuIUN & T. STANLEY, supra note 78, at 69-81; L. OLVEY, H. LEONARD & B.
ARULNGHAUS, supra note 454, at 117, 119.
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Because the weakening of the defense industrial base is the result
of a complex of policy decisions and economics, the Exon-Florio
Amendment will not halt this decline. The' growth of an interde-
pendent international economy is unlikely to change course as a result
of the Exon-Florio Amendment.
Defense analysts debate whether foreign sourcing, 462 the purchase
of supplies, manufactured goods, or technologies from a company
located outside the U.S. or Canada, is a "grave threat" or "an un-
avoidable and healthy outgrowth of the ongoing globalization of the
economy."463 One potential problem with adopting a defense pro-
curement policy that limits purchases to enterprises located within U.S.
territory is the increased cost of such a policy.4 As defense budgets
are limited, paying higher prices for military supplies and equipment
also can result in a decline of the defense industrial base. The exclusion
of foreign-controlled suppliers may lead to the loss of foreign-devel-
oped technologies essential to the maintenance of an effective defense.
In addition, restrictions on foreign investments have been criticized
by defense analysts as injuring U.S. industries that need additional
capital investments. 465
There are national security risks, however, that must be balanced
against the benefits to the defense industrial base resulting from for-
eign sourcing and foreign control of defense industries. These include
the risk that the foreign-controlled business will follow an agenda de-
veloped by its home nation or function as an agent for its home
nation.46 Another risk is the loss of productivity in a domestic-based
subsidiary of a foreign-controlled company that is expropriated or
otherwise cut off from its parent company during wartime. 467 Finally,
462. Foreign sourcing is distinguished from foreign dependence, which is defined as a foreign
enterprise that has no competitors in the U.S. or Canada who can produce the goods or
technology. See Am FoRCE AssOCIAnoN & USNI DATABAE, supra note 82, at 16.
463. See id. at 17.
464. Trading between nations maximizes the wealth of each as a result of the principle of
comparative advantage. M. Kannqn., supra note 24, at 221. Because each nation has different
resources, including labor, raw materials, capital, and technology, the cost of producing a product
in a particular nation will vary. Id. at 218-21. Through international trade, each nation maximizes
its total wealth by producing products that it can produce efficiently vis-A-vis other nations and
trading those products for others that are produced more efficiently in other nations. Id.
465. See J. ELUsoN, J. FRaurma & T. STAM.EY, supra note 78, at 69-81.
466. See E. GnAs & P. KauoimAN, supra note 25, at 75. There is evidence that U.S.
multinationals have used their foreign subsidiaries to impair the military efforts of the host
nations. In the 1930s and 1940s, U.S.-controlled petroleum companies attempted to boycott
shipments of crude oil to Japanese-controlled refiners. Id. at 77.
467. See id. In World War I, German-controlled chemical companies in the U.S. were
sequestered under the Trading with the Enemy Act. There was evidence that the U.S. subsidiaries
did not have access to all the technologies of the parent. Id. at 79-80.
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there always remains a risk that classified information will be leaked
by the foreign controlled firm.468
These risks can justify the undefined national security standard
in the Exon-Florio Amendment. The bulk of current foreign direct
investment in the U.S., however, is held by nationals in NATO nations
who are aligned strategically with the U.S.469 The risks of a potential
war with these nations is low. Consequently, the aforementioned risks
to national security posed by current foreign direct investments may
not justify the costs inherent in the current Exon-Florio Amendment.
A stronger justification for the undefined national security stan-
dard in the Exon-Florio Amendment is based on the changing inter-
national order and the recent changes in the defense industrial base
that implicate defense policies.
Although the process of identifying national security risks and
translating these risks into a foreign investment policy that at once
provides guidance to foreign investors and supports changing national
security interests is complicated, experts and data exist to support de-
velopment of such a policy. In any event, if the CFIUS is to play an
effective role in both protecting the national security and minimizing
the regulatory costs of such protection, it will need to develop and
publicize a more specific foreign investment policy. Congress' inten-
tional omission of a clear definition of national security in the Amend-
ment impliedly acknowledges two sources of change in the definition
of national defense interests.
The departure point for arriving at a reasoned definition of na-
tional defense interests is an evaluation of the current U.S. defense
strategy as reflected in military programs and planning .470 Since World
War II, the U.S. defense strategy has been based on a policy of de-
terrence. 471 The goal of this policy was to preserve peaceful relations
between the U.S. and other nations by maintaining military forces
around the globe.472 The effectiveness of these forces in asserting a
sufficient threat to aggression was believed to require superior military
technology. 473 This requirement was considered especially critical for
counteracting the large military force maintained by the Soviet Un-
ion. 474
468. Id. This particular risk is found also in U.S.-controlled defense firms and has prompted
the development of the Defense Department's security clearance regulatory system. Id. at 85.
469. Id. at 85.
470. See J. BLAcswai¢, supra note 81, at 39.
471. L. OLVEY, H. LEONARD & B. ALvnrGHAos, supra note 454, at 105; see C. HITCH & R.
McK-AN, supra note 78, at 333-50 (describing and critiquing past defense strategies).
472. See C. HrrcH & R. McKRAN, supra note 78, at 344-50.
473. See id. at 335; Am FoRcE AssocIATioN & USNI DATABAsE, supra note 82, at 21.
474. Id.
[Vol. 42
This past defense strategy is likely to change in the near future
as U.S. relations with the Soviet Union improve. 475 Current Soviet
proposals for reductions of both troops and nuclear missiles in Eu-
rope, the growing independence of Eastern European nations, and the
closer integration of Europe under the Common Market represent fun-
damental historical changes that are likely to impact U.S. defense
strategy significantly.476 These changes necessarily will effect changes
in the definition of the national security.
Once a particular U.S. defense strategy has been adopted, the
Department of Defense develops acquisition programs that procure
weapons and stockpiles of strategic and critical material.477 A signif-
icant influence on the definition of national security occurs at the ac-
quisition level as a result of shifts over time in program budgets, the
prioritization of particular programs, and the type of technology avail-
able. These shifts may be accompanied by the movement of particular
industries in and out of the defense industrial base.478 This phenom-
enon has become more critical with today's higher paced technological
changes and with the growth of dual use goods.
Once a stable defense strategy is established and programs for
furthering that strategy have been implemented, particular industries
and enterprises that are critical to the ongoing support of those pro-
grams, and consequently to the national security, must be identified.479
Some experts consider currently compiled information on these en-
terprises inadequate for a meaningful evaluation of the status and
problems associated with the defense industry. 40 Information on for-
eign-supplied materials, as distinguished from materials supplied by
foreign-controlled companies, may be even more urgent. 4s Accurate
475. See generally Hyland, America's New Course, 69 FoRmcN Aza. 1, 2 (1990).
476. See Horelick, U.S.-Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era, 69 FoPIoN Ass. 51, 51
(1990).
477. J. EusoN, J. FRumIN & T. STANLEY, supra note 78, at 72.
478. The leather goods industry is an example of an industry moving out of the defense
industrial base. J. BLAcKwEza, supra note 81, at 38. During World War I, this industry was a
critical supplier of combat boots for U.S. forces. At the time of World War I, foreign
manufacturers of leather boots were either enemies of the U.S. or unable to meet the U.S.
military's demand for leather boots. Id. Today, however, combat boots are increasingly made
of non-leather materials and domestic production of combat boots is no longer critical. Id.
479. See E. GRAmm & P. KRuGmAN, supra note 25, at 88-89 (arguing that a "must-maintain-
domestic-control" list should be developed).
480. A variety of public and private organizations routinely collect data on defense spending.
According to the sector codes used by the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Department of
Defense purchases its material from 215 sectors. The total number of sectors devised by the
Department of Commerce coding system is 1000. Blackwell claims that much more information
about these military suppliers and the defense industrial base can be obtained from these sources.J. BLAcKwELL, supra note 81, at 39; see also J. ELUSON, J. Fnpxaar & T. SrAMLEY, supra note
78, at 13 (discussing current research problems).
481. E. GtR m & P. KRUGMAN, supra note 25, at 83.
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and reliable defense industry data are crucial for defining national
security in the context of the Exon-Florio Amendment.
Once the industries critical to defense programs are identified, the
degree of market concentration in each industry must be measured. 48 2
Foreign-controlled suppliers who have near monopolies in the inter-
national marketplace pose a greater risk to national security than a
supplier who faces many competitors. 483 In such concentrated indus-
tries, the development and maintenance of an alternative domestic sup-
ply source may be warranted. 484 But as long as other sources of foreign
or domestic supply are available, there is less justification for pro-
tecting a domestic supplier and foregoing the benefits of cost savings
available in the international marketplace.
Expansion of the definition of industries that "may impair the
national security" beyond the defense industrial base to include in-
dustries and businesses deemed essential to the health and competi-
tiveness of the U.S. economy clearly would depart from the current
U.S. open door policy. Although past policies toward foreign in-
vestment have recognized the interrelationship between national de-
fense and commercial interests, foreign investment restrictions in areas
unrelated to the defense industrial base largely have been limited to
public utility industries that have strategic importance. Adoption of
a standard that encompasses a significant portion of non-defense sec-
tor industries could result in the type of political decisionmaking proc-
ess that characterized Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act
discussed above.485 Under such a standard, protectionist measures un-
related to national defense objectives may be implemented. Moreover,
if the costs of capital and other economic inputs increase as a result
of a decrease in the inward flow of foreign investments, military pro-
grams will be affected adversely by higher costs.
A. Proposed Regulations-Need for Reform
The proposed regulations under the Exon-Florio Amendment have
been criticized widely for their failure to delimit more clearly those
investments that may be prohibited on national security grounds. 86
482. Id. at 86-89.
483. Id. at 87-89.
484. Krugman argues that this situation poses problems that may not be solved adequately
by a forced divestiture. Such an action may result simply in a weak competitor who is unable
to keep up with the technological developments of the old parent company. Id.
485. See Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 120 (June 21, 1990) (discussing charges of
politicization in the Exon-Florio process).
486. See supra notes 247, 258.
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Like the Amendment itself, the proposed regulations give a large de-
gree of discretion to the CFIUS and the President to define the un-
derlying national security standard on a case-by-case basis. 4 7 Although
judicial review of CFIUS decisions under the Exon-Florio Amendment
is likely to be restricted to procedural matters only, 4 8 a case can be
made that the current regulatory scheme as embodied in the proposed
regulations does not protect adequately the property rights of parties
to an acquisition.489 The lack of adequate guidelines to identify the
particular national security policy enforced by the CFIUS results in
a decisionmaking process in which policy-making and adjudication are
intertwined. 490 As a result, courts reviewing CFIUS decisions will have
difficulty determining whether the due process rights of the parties to
a transaction have been violated.
These shortcomings can be alleviated by the adoption of a na-
tional security policy that identifies exempt industries and protected
technologies. A similar approach to the problem of defining national
security is followed already under the Export Administration Act. 491
Moreover, due to the interrelationship between trade policy and for-
eign investment policy-their common purpose being to protect the
defense industrial base-application of the Exon-Florio Amendment
should be coordinated consistently with export control policies in order
to enhance the effectiveness of each. 492
Other reforms that would decrease foreign investment risks by
providing more guidance to investors include the formal adoption of
de minimus exceptions-such as those contained in the Hart-Scott-Ro-
dino Antitrust Improvements Act,493 management conditions-such as
those contained in the Defense Department's Industrial Security Re-
gulations, 494 and foreign control presumptions-such as those followed
by the Bureau of Land Management in leasing decisions. 495
(1) De Minimis Exceptions
Since the currently proposed regulations contain no dollar value
or market share thresholds, acquisitions of small businesses are subject
487. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
488. See supra Part IV.B.
489. See supra Parts IV. D.-E. (fifth amendment argument).
490. See supra Part IV.C.
491. See supra text accompanying notes 206-226.
492. Id.
493. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988). The premerger reporting requirements of § 18a apply only to
firms that meet the size of person test. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
494. See supra text accompanying notes 143-157.
495. See supra text accompanying notes 141-142.
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to Exon-Florio review. In the manufacturing and service sectors, small
businesses are unlikely to have a substantial impact on national se-
curity because their individual share of the national market will be
small and substitute suppliers of their products and services can be
found easily. In these sectors, adoption of a de minimis threshold is
a reasonable exception that not only will decrease investment risks for
foreign investors, but also will save the CFIUS and foreign investors
the costs associated with filing and reviewing acquisition notices .496
Such de minimis exceptions, however, may need to be sector-specific.
For example, certain small firms involved in high-technology research
and development may be critical to national security. Unless the na-
tional security interests in these firms are protected sufficiently by other
regulations or licensing requirements, they should not qualify under
the de minimis exceptions to Exon-Florio review.
(2) Management Conditions
The Department of Defense has used management conditions to
insulate foreign owners from controlling business operations critical
to national security pursuant to the Defense Industrial Security Re-
gulations.497 These conditions include the establishment of voting trusts,
irrevocable proxy agreements, and board resolutions restricting the
control of foreign owners. 49 In the past, the CFIUS itself has ap-
proved acquisitions subject to certain conditions and assurances from
management. 499 Formal adoption of management conditions by the
proposed regulations would provide foreign investors with a passive
investment alternative as opposed to an outright ban on investments
in businesses considered critical to the national security. Adoption of
these management arrangements in the context of the Exon-Florio
Amendment may be problematic, however, if ongoing oversight is re-
quired. Unlike the Department of Defense, which has authority to
496. As an example of the burden involved, one party was said to have paid $20,000 in legal
fees for the preparation of a CFIUS filing. Interview with San Francisco attorney (November
1990).
De minimis exceptions have been included in statutes such as the Foreign Investment in Real
Property Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, subtit. C, § 6039 C(b)(4)(B)(i), 26 U.S.C. §
6039c, 94 Stat. 2688 (1980).
497. See DEPARTMNT OF DEFENSE, INDUSTRIAL SECURITY REGULATION, DIREcTIVE 5220.22-R
(1983); see supra text accompanying notes 143-157.
498. Id.
499. Dennin, supra note 16, at 375. This has been done during the informal negotiation
process used by the CFIUS in reviewing acquisitions. There is no definitive legal authority under
the Amendment or the regulations for imposing such conditions.
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oversee the operations of its contractors on an ongoing basis, 5°° the
authority conferred by the Amendment terminates once a reported
transaction is approved.501
(3) Foreign Control Presumptions
A critical element of the proposed regulations that broadens the
scope of the Exon-Florio Amendment is the provision defining foreign
control as potential as well as actual control.502 This reflects a marked
change from the control test used by the court in No Oilport! v.
Carte °50 and the clear guidelines of other entry restrictions that pre-
sume control only when the foreign owner holds twenty-five percent
or more of the business' stock.50 This change may be a hedge against
creative financial arrangements and instruments that are used instead
of stock offerings to finance businesses. Instead of providing an ex-
haustive list of transactions subject to the Amendment and stock own-
ership presumptions, the proposed regulations emphasize a multifactor
control test that examines the actual or potential influence and control
that a foreign owner may have over specific business decisions.
Although this expansion in the definition of control may be a
farsighted response to the changing practices of corporate finance, it
is so broad that it provides very limited guidelines to foreign investors
and is likely to prove unworkable as a standard. At a minimum, the
establishment of control presumptions at different levels of stock and
bond ownership would seem warranted to both minimize the risk to
foreign investors and ensure that the CFIUS is not overwhelmed with
transactions involving insubstantial foreign interests. As new types of
financial arrangements are adopted that permit significant control by
foreign investors, the CFIUS can adopt additional regulations that
provide clear guidance to the investment community.
500. For examples of statutes that establish a framework for ongoing regulation of business,
see, Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988); Federal Communications
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1988).
501. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. Given that currently the CFIUS extracts
conditions and assurances from foreign investors in the process of approving acquisitions and
mergers, the Amendment should be modified to provide for some form of ongoing oversight
and enforcement of these conditions and assurances. See supra note 499 and accompanying text.
Foreign investors may find such ongoing regulation desirable if it increases the probability of
obtaining CFIUS approval.
502. See supra notes 272-276 and accompanying text.
503. 520 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
504. See supra text accompanying notes 137-142 (definition of control under the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920).
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B. CFIUS Reform
Proposals similar to those in this Note were submitted to the
CFIUS during the public comment period on the proposed regulations
that ended on September 12, 1989.505 Since then there has been sub-
stantial delay in the issuance of the final regulations, and the Bush
Administration has attempted to block the permanent reauthorization
of the Exon-Florio Amendment, which expired on October 20, 1990.1°
This delay reflects the underlying disagreements among CFIUS mem-
bers over the content of Exon-Florio national security guidelines.) 7
Currently, the CFIUS is the "cumulative sum of its individual
member agencies," who take different positions on the issues of for-
eign investment. 08 The Department of Treasury, which chairs the
CFIUS and takes a leadership role in the review process, has an in-
stitutional interest in supporting the free flow of foreign capital in-
vestments into the United States.5 9 Other member agencies, such as
the Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce, are
internally divided on foreign investment issues. For example, observers
believe the International Security Policy and Trade Security Policy
offices of the Defense Department are suspicious that foreign investors
present inherent security risks, while other Defense Department of-
fices, such as the Office of International Security Affairs, are receptive
to foreign investment in industries that are part of the defense in-
dustrial base.
The current disruptive effects of these conflicts on the effective-
ness of the CFIUS as a policy-making body can be alleviated best by
reorganizing CFIUS as a more independent agency. 10 The current
CFIUS members should be replaced with appointees who function in-
dependently of other federal agencies and departments. Agency pro-
cedures should provide a forum for the current members of the CFIUS,
505. See supra text accompanying note 39. Stephen Canner, Director of the Office of
International Investment in the Treasury Department, who is also responsible for administering
the Exon-Florio Amendment, stated that the definition of national security was one of the major
themes raised by commentators. Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 33, at 1990 (Feb. 16, 1990).
506. In February 1990 the Treasury Department stated that the final regulations would be
out in Spring 1990. See also supra note 4.
507. Pine, Plans to Fortify Foreign Investment Panel Earn Praise, Scorn, L.A. Times, Aug.
29, 1989, pt. 4, at 1, col. 2.
508. Dennin, supra note 16, at 4-7.
509. The Treasury Department's responsibility for financing the U.S. debt has led it to
advocate an open door policy toward foreign investment. See 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1458, 432 (Mar. 22 1990) (comments by Howard Samuel, President of the Industrial
Union Department of the AFL-CIO).
510. The CFIUS was created originally in 1975 to serve as a study group responsible for
monitoring direct foreign investment in the U.S. See supra note 17.
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foreign investors, and other interested parties to present their views
on foreign investment policy directives. Such an independent mem-
bership, coupled with the adoption of clear policy standards and more
formal methods for reviewing filed applications, is more likely to en-
able the CFIUS to adopt clearer national security policies and to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of the parties involved in acquisition
transactions.
Conclusion
A desirable foreign investment policy should maximize the ben-
efits from the unobstructed movement of capital across national bor-
ders and vigorous international competition while minimizing any
resulting risks to national security. By enacting the Exon-Florio
Amendment, Congress has delegated to the President broad authority
for balancing these frequently competing interests.
Because Congress intentionally failed to define a national security
standard and expressly stated that the "presidential findings" justi-
fying an action to block a merger or acquisition shall not be subject
to judicial review, the courts are likely to defer to the President's judg-
ment on substantive matters. Because of the substantial property in-
terests that may be at risk, however, parties to an acquisition must
be afforded procedural due process protections.
The proposed regulations fail to indicate to foreign investors the
national security policy objectives driving acquisition review decisions
under Exon-Florio. The absence of a "control list" of critical in-
dustries, a broad definition of foreign control which includes "po-
tential control," and a list of transactions whichincludes joint venture
agreements and debt financing arrangements results in a regulatory
scheme devoid of meaningful guidance. Moreover, because of the con-
fidentiality surrounding each acquisition reviewed under Exon-Florio,
foreign investors cannot obtain substantial guidance from the past ac-
quisitions reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States.
This regulatory landscape calls to mind Justice Black's charac-
terization of national security as "a broad, vague generality." 5 The
benefit of such vagueness is the power to shift policy positions quickly
in order to protect new technologies deemed critical to the U.S. de-
fense industrial base. The dangers of such vagueness include a less
favorable investment climate for foreign investors, a weakened foreign
511. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971).
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policy position in international forums such as the GATT and the
OECD, higher defense costs, and unchecked presidential power that
can result in a corrupted decisionmaking process.
This Note proposes that the vague generality of national security
be replaced by specific guidelines that exempt from the provisions of
Exon-Florio particular industries and technologies not critical to the
national defense as determined by a careful analysis of defense pro-
curement data and current military strategies. In addition, in order
to achieve a more careful balancing of national security interests and
an open door policy, the adoption of foreign control presumptions
based on the equity held by foreign investors and the exemption of
management conditions that restrict the management control exerted
by foreign owners is crucial.
APPENDIX A: Federal Statutes Restricting Entry
STATUTE SCOPE ENFORCEMENT COMMENTS
Federal Aviation Air carriers, manu- Department of Restrictions on indi-
Act of 195812 facturers of aircraft Transportation rect carrier operations
and parts, other car- lifted after 1981.513
rier services and op-
erations
Communications Broadcasters and Federal Commun- Since 1982 aliens
Act of 1934'14 common carriers of ications Commis- who can legally be
radio and television sion employed in the U.S.
are eligible for li-
censes.
515
Mining Law of Exploration and pur- Department of In- Restrictions do not
18725'6 chase of mineral terior apply to U.S. corpo-
rights and lands con- rations controlled by
taining source materi- foreign investors.
als (e.g., thorium
and uranium)
512. Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 408, 72 Stat. 731, 767-68 (1959), amended by Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-507, § 26, 92 Stat. 1705, 1726-28 (1980) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C.A. app. § 1378 (West Supp. 1990)). The Federal Aviation Act subjects mergers and acquisitions
of U.S. air carriers to a review and approval process conducted by the Department of Transportation.
49 U.S.C.A. app. § 1378 (West Supp. 1990). This section includes a policy against control of a
U.S. carrier by a foreign air carrier or person. Id. § 1378(a)(4).
The statute also contains procedures for granting a foreign air carrier a license. Factors considered
in granting these licenses include: public interest in the new air service; relations between the U.S.
and the other countries served; treatment of U.S. carriers in the home country of the applicant
that owns and controls the foreign carrier; relevant treaties and conventions; and the benefits of
granting the license to the development of a safe, adequate, and competitive air transportation
system. Id. § 1378(b).
513. After the adoption of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-507, 92 Stat.
1705 (1980), and the International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979 (IATCA), Pub. L.
No. 96-162, 94 Stat. 35 (1981), restrictions on foreign ownership of indirect carrier operations were
lifted. These operations include charter companies, freight forwarders, etc.
514. Pub. L. No. 73416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-713
(1982 & Supp. V 198M). Licenses are issued only to persons who are found to be qualified by the
Commission and who can be employed legally in the U.S. 47 U'S.C. § 303 (1982). No license can
be granted to or held by a foreign government or representative thereof. Id. § 310(a). No foreign
corporation may obtain a license for a broadcast common carrier, aeronautical en route or fixed
radio station. Id. § 310(b)(l).
515. See Communications Amendment Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, § 109, 96 Stat. 1087,
1092 (1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303(1)(1) (1982)) (amending Communications Act of 1934).
516. Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1873) (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-42
(1988)). Corporations organized under U.S. law are not prohibited from obtaining mineral claims
under this Act. Such companies only need to show their Articles of Incorporation as there is no
inquiry into the citizenship of their stockholders. 30 U.S.C. § 24 (1988). This practice is in accord
with the ruling in Doe v. Waterloo Mining Co., 70 F. 455, 463 (9th Cir. 1895).
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STATUTE SCOPE ENFORCEMENT COMMENTS
Atomic Energy Transfer, receipt, Nuclear Regula- 1973 ruling of AEC
Act of 19541'1 possession or trade tory Commission indicates foreign en-
of nuclear source tity may own a sub-
material; operation stantial interest in a
of facilities that use facility as long as the
nuclear material interest is not con-
trolling.1'8
Mineral Leasing Leases of federal Department of In-
Act of 19209 land for mining of terior
coal, oil, oil shale,
gas, and non-fuel
minerals
Merchant Marine Merchant shipping Coast Guard
Act of 192052 °  between points within
U.S., its territories
and possessions
517. Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 69, 68 Stat. 919, 934-35 (1955) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2099
(1988)). Foreign ownership and control is a factor in the license application process for removing
and disposing of nuclear source material. The Act prohibits the issuance of a license to a "person
for such purpose would be inimical to the common defense and security or the health and safety
of the public." 42 U.S.C. § 2099 (1988). This provision has been interpreted to require consideration
of foreign ownership and control as a factor. Sections 103(d) and 104(d) prohibit the NRC from
issuing a license for nuclear production facilities including those used for medical therapy, research
and development, industrial, or commercial purposes to a foreign-owned or controlled entity.
Applicants for licenses must file information on the citizenship of owners, directors, etc. 10 C.F.R.
§ 50.33(d) (1990).
518. In re General Atomic Co., Nos. 50-89, 50-101, 50-163, 50-227, 50-290 (Dec. 14, 1973),
reprinted in U.S. Nuc.EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, LEcAL QU-SToNs OF FOaIGN CONTROL AND
DOMINATION RAIsED By PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FACIrY OPERATING LICENSE No R-81 FRoM UNroN
CARBrDE SuBSmRY "B," INC. TO CINrcHaM, INC. 7 (June 1, 1983). Subsequent to this ruling,
approval was granted to transfer operating licenses held by a U.S. company to a joint venture
company in which Royal Dutch/Shell Group, a foreign entity, owned a 50% interest. Approval
was subject to the adoption of conditions that gave custody and control over nuclear materials to
U.S. citizens and required the management to conduct the venture in a manner consistent with the
protection of the common defense and security of the U.S. Id.
519. Act of Feb. 25, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-146, § 1, 41 Stat. 437, 437-38 (1921) (codified as
amended at 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1988)). The Act requires that the Secretary of the Interior only grant
leases to U.S. citizens and U.S. corporations. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1988). Foreign investors may own
stock in a U.S. corporation that has mineral leases from the government if the Department of the
Interior determines that the home country of the foreign investors grants U.S. investors similar
rights. Id.; 43 C.F.R. § 3102.2 (1990). In determining if the existence of foreign stockholders from
non-reciprocal countries should trigger the prohibition of Section 1, the Department of Interior has
adopted a control test that is applied to the facts of each case. Ownership of 50% or more of
voting stock is presumed to establish control. Minority ownership is presumed not to control. J.
MARANs & J. RUSCH, supra note 107, at 451.
520. Pub. L. No. 66-261, § 27, 41 Stat. 988, 999 (1921) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.
app. § 883 (Supp. V 1987)). The Act provides that merchandise transported between points in the
U.S. must be transported in a vessel owned by persons who are citizens of the United States. 46
U.S.C. app. § 883 (Supp. V 1987).
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